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Abstract 
 
 
The scope of this project is threefold. Firstly, it is metaphilosophical, as it concerns a question 
of method. Secondly, it is aesthetical, as it concerns a question of method in aesthetics and the 
philosophy of art. Thirdly, it is historiographical, as it draws from the corpus of the philosophy 
of art, aesthetics and art history, and considers these texts not only by way of their ideas but 
also by way of their history.  
 
This dissertation entertains a significant organizational shift by adopting and adapting a 
narrower scope of anglophone aesthetics (AA). This shift renders AA as biphasic, admitting 
of earlier (EAA) and later (LAA) phases, the ‘early-late distinction’, categorized by exemplary 
texts per phase. Upon investigation of these texts, the EAA-LAA shift poses a constitutive 
methodological shift, the Problem of Systematic Inconsistency (PSI), from non-systematicity 
to systematicity. This inconsistency, it is argued, is merely apparent, and is explainable as a 
swapping of priority between analytic and systematic methods from EAA to LAA, which 
holds systematicity of some sort to be implicit in EAA. To elucidate this, various modes of 
analysis and models of system are presented. 
 
From a formalist outlook, an historiographical examination of cubism is used to concretize 
the proposed solution to the PSI. Of particular focus is the shift from analytic (AC) to 
synthetic (SC) cubism, wherein it is diagrammatically shown that cubist ‘signs’ played an 
implicit role throughout AC like that described of systematicity throughout EAA. 
Comparison between realist and idealist art yields a key distinction, the ‘unitary-plenary 
distinction’, between two definitions of system in terms of the presence or absence of a 
privileged ‘kernel’.   
 
That both EAA and LAA entertained a realist plenary rather than idealist unitary systematicity, 
implicit in the former and explicit in the latter, is the solution to the PSI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
This dissertation was inspired by a passing comment within an essay titled Method and 
Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Art, published in October 2014, not one month after I had 
arrived to London from America. Thank you to Professor Sebastian Gardner for authoring 
that paper and for your supervision over the past two years; likewise to Dr James Wilson. 
Thank you to my fellow MPhil Studs for abiding my babbling on cubism in seminar -- thrice; 
likewise to Drs Fiona Leigh and Han Van Wietmarschen. Thank you to the Rockefeller 
Archive Center, especially to Mary Ann Quinn, for her help with the Isenberg archives.  
I have found a new genius to love in him.  
 
My grandest thanks, perhaps, go to Professor Richard Kamber, my gadfly, an instructor, 
sponsor, colleague, and friend, who inspired my entry into philosophy and aesthetics.  
And finally, thank you to my Family, who have shipped this American to England to think 
and to write on the Americans and the English and their arts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Table of  Contents 
 
  
 Declaration................................................................................................................................... 
 Abstract......................................................................................................................................... 
 Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................... 
 
1 AESTHETICS, ART, ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS AND SYSTEM..................................................... 
1.1 The Anglophone Aesthetics Programme............................................................... 
1.1.1 Statement of the Early-Late Distinction.................................................... 
1.1.2 A Primer on Anglophone Aesthetics and Analytic Philosophy............. 
1.1.3 A Primer on Early Anglophone Aesthetics............................................... 
1.1.4 A Primer on Late Anglophone Aesthetics................................................. 
1.1.5 A Problem in Anglophone Aesthetics........................................................ 
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Thesis.................................................................... 
1.3 Analysis, Synthesis and System in Analytic Philosophy...................................... 
1.3.1 A Primer on Analysis.................................................................................... 
1.3.2 A Primer on System...................................................................................... 
1.4 Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 
 
2 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS AND SYSTEM IN CUBISM (c. 1907-1920s)....................................... 
2.1 Cubism........................................................................................................................ 
2.1.1 Cubism: a History and Philosophy.............................................................. 
2.1.2 Cubism: a Case-Study.................................................................................... 
2.1.2.1 A Note on Formalism................................................................. 
2.1.2.2 Analytic Cubism (c. 1907-1912)................................................. 
2.1.2.3 Synthetic Cubism (c. 1912-1920s)............................................. 
2.1.3 Conclusion to ‘Cubism: a Case-Study’........................................................ 
2.1.4 Statement of the Unitary-Plenary Distinction.......................................... 
2.2 Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 
 
3 EARLY ANGLOPHONE AESTHETICS (c. 1946-1965)............................................................. 
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 
3.1.1 Isenberg (1950)............................................................................................... 
3.1.2 Elton (1954).................................................................................................... 
3.1.3 Margolis (1962)............................................................................................... 
3.1.4 Barrett (1965).................................................................................................. 
3.2 Analysis in Early Anglophone Aesthetics.............................................................. 
3.3 System in Early Anglophone Aesthetics................................................................ 
3.4 Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 
3 
5 
7 
 
13 
13 
16 
17 
21 
23 
24 
25 
27 
27 
30 
33 
 
35 
35 
36 
39 
40 
45 
47 
47 
48 
51 
 
53 
53 
53 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
60 
10 
 
 
4 LATE ANGLOPHONE AESTHETICS (c. 1964-1988)................................................................ 
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 
4.1.1 Danto (1964)................................................................................................... 
4.1.2 Goodman (1968)............................................................................................ 
4.1.3 Wollheim (1968)............................................................................................. 
4.2 Analysis in Late Anglophone Aesthetics................................................................ 
4.3 System in Late Anglophone Aesthetics.................................................................. 
4.4 Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 
 
5 ANALYTICITY & SYSTEMATICITY IN EARLY & LATE ANGLOPHONE AESTHETICS....... 
5.1 General Conclusion................................................................................................... 
5.2 Restatement of the Early-Late Distinction............................................................ 
5.3 Restatement of the Unitary-Plenary Distinction.................................................. 
5.4 Restatement of the Problem and Thesis................................................................ 
 
6 APPENDIX.................................................................................................................................... 
 
7 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................................ 
 
 
63 
63 
63 
67 
72 
76 
76 
77 
 
79 
79 
79 
79 
79 
 
83 
 
109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I believe we may say that the best work in the field is to be done, if it is done at all,  
by young and unknown people. These people will appear if and when  
graduate students become convinced that aesthetics is worth studying.  
 
The subject, analytical aesthetics, remains largely to be created. 
 
 
 
Arnold Isenberg, 1950:  
Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art 
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CHAPTER 1 
Aesthetics, Art, Analysis, Synthesis, and System 
 
 
1.1 The Anglophone Aesthetics Programme 
Analytical or anglophone aesthetics (AA) names a philosophical programme which sought to 
reform traditional aesthetics and philosophy of art from its so-called wooliness and 
dreariness.1 It is exemplified by works published in the US and UK2 during the mid-to-late 
twentieth century. These constitute a modest asterism of papers collectivized through a 
constellation of references, citations, and bibliographic entries.3 What drives this 
collectivization is a common push against idealism in aesthetics, with its essentialist, 
metaphysical, and systematizing biases (among others). Like the more general trends 
throughout twentieth-century philosophy, AA was influenced by two key developments: the 
integration of philosophy with formal logic, an upshot of the analytic turn (AT), and the 
integration of philosophical logic with language, an upshot of the linguistic turn (LT).  
Its itinerary was therefore one of argumentative clarity and accuracy.4 Its contrasts, the 
Passmorean errors of so-called traditional aesthetics, were perhaps not quite so wooly and 
dreary as they might prima facie seem, however. In his essay Analytic Aesthetics (2013), 
Lamarque reminds us that prominent journals published aesthetical papers well throughout 
the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s,5 all with the proper analytical-mindedness demanded by the 
new tradition; the establishment of The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (1942) in the US, 
and the British Journal of Aesthetics (1960) in the UK, were and are testament to the existent 
and persisting quality of aesthetical scholarship throughout this time.6 Instead, the 
characteristics of AA are perhaps more appropriately acknowledged through the provisos 
that Lamarque offers: (1) the division between aesthetics proper and the philosophy of art, 
and (2) the subdivision of the philosophy of art into the various art forms, thereby generating 
the philosophies of the arts.7 To these, I add a third: (3) the transliteration of the ‘philosophy 
of art’ into the ‘philosophy of art criticism.’ The first, emerging quite late in the programme, 
was explicitly and perhaps firstly recommended in Isenberg et al Aesthetics (1954), the second 
in Passmore’s oft-quoted The Dreariness of Aesthetics (1951), and the third in Isenberg’s seminal 
                                                          
1  Passmore (1951): 325, 335. Note that I do not here include ‘dullness’, cf. Wisdom (1948), or ‘pretentiousness’, 
cf. Isenberg (1952). 
2  I shall refer to this programme as anglophone rather than analytic(al) aesthetics, though shall generally use the 
abbreviation ‘AA.’ This dissertation entails examination of the concept of analysis (among others) and its 
various modes; to talk of ‘analytical aesthetics’ without first specifying the mode or modes of analysis involved 
is to talk imprecisely. I shall therefore opt to use the programme’s geo-historical (‘anglophone’) rather than its 
historio-philosophical (‘analytical’) name, since I find the former to be less prone to such errors. 
3 Cf. Silvers (1987): 137, endnote 3; Mothersill (1973): xix-xx.  
4  Shusterman (1987, 1989): 121, 13: “Descriptive clarity versus prescriptive accuracy was [AA’s]...dilemma.” 
5  Lamarque (2013): 770; Tilghman (1973): 1. 
6  Lamarque (2013): 770-772. (Cf. Isenberg et al. (1954); cf. §3.1.1.) 
7  Lamarque (2013): 772-773.  
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Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art (1950). It was in these papers (and the collections that 
subsequently contained them) that AA found its first light. 
In a special issue of JAAC titled Analytic Aesthetics: Retrospect and Prospect (1987), which 
later derived the collection titled Analytic Aesthetics (1989), Shusterman brought together ten 
new essays8 on the then-current status of AA. In his editor’s introductions to each of these 
collections, Shusterman (1987, 1989) identifies eight typical features and themes 
characteristic of AA, by which the programme is to be understood. The characteristics are:9 
 
1 Analytical: consequential of the Moorean-Russellian-Wittgensteinian approach to 
philosophy; 
 
2 Anti-idealist: rebellious against transcendental and idealistic aesthetic theories, then 
dominated by Crocean romantic-idealist aesthetics; 
 
3 Anti-essentialist: rejective of essentialism in and across the arts, distinctively through 
occupation with language and usage;  
 
4  Asocial: neglectful of art’s social context; 
 
5  Ahistorical: neglectful of art’s historical context;  
 
6 Metacritical: fundamentally second-order, in occupation with the critical clarification 
of first-order concepts (e.g.) art and art criticism;  
 
Where two consequences follow from this lattermost characteristic: 
 
7 Anaturalistic: neglectful of natural beauty, in preoccupation with art;  
 
8 Non-evaluative: abstinent in evaluation, generally opting to transfer such issues to 
first-order criticism itself. 
 
Admittedly, the most crucial and influential of these characteristics are 1, 2, 3, and 6. It is 
from these that Silvers (1987) identifies three guiding theses -- one positive and two negative 
-- for the reformation due of aesthetics, and by which she characterizes AA as proceeding. 
These are what I shall call:10 
 
1 The clarity thesis: “Aesthetics must be reformed by replacing its typically obscure 
and confused ideas with clear ones.” 
 
2 The non-generality thesis: “Aesthetics must be reformed by prohibiting the practice 
of generalizing insights gained from experience of particular artworks and then 
expecting the generalizations to function as rules in aesthetic arguments.” 
 
3 The anti-essentialism thesis: “Aesthetics must be reformed by recognizing that art 
admits of no essential properties.” 
 
                                                          
8  This is not entirely accurate. The 1987 JAAC issue contained eight new papers, including Shusterman’s 
introduction, as well as an abridged reprinting of Isenberg’s 1950 report. The 1989 collection contained ten 
revised papers, excluding Isenberg’s (and others), and including four not in the JAAC; cf. Acknowledgements.  
9 Shusterman (1987, 1989): 116, 4; 117, 5; 117, 6; 120, 10; 120, 11; 118, 7; 118, 8; 119, 9; respectively.  
10 Silvers (1987): 138-139.  
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While the first is no doubt contributive to the second and third, it is the latter two that find 
particular centrality within AA. This is because they share a key misunderstanding, namely, 
“the traditional cause of misguided generalization -- the desire to be definitive about art,” 
where ‘definitive’ is to be read as ‘definitional,’ that is, seeking a definition for what art is.11 
Traditionally, aesthetic theory itself was the attempt to make such a definition explicit. 
Orthodox formulations of this endeavor take the form of a closed essential or real definition: 
an enumeration of the properties or necessary-and-sufficient criteria for a thing to fall under 
the concept ART, thereby characterizing all and only the things denoted by the term ‘art’ as 
art-objects or artworks.12 Unorthodox formulations, however, may take various other open 
forms, including: cluster-concepts, art-type, and hybrid theories of various sorts.13 According 
to proponents of the anti-essentialism thesis -- the so-called anti-essentialists14 -- the 
definability of ART is an upshot of the essentialist fallacy: that in order to define something, an 
object or event, one must know its unitary nature or essence.15 Weitz’s neo-Wittgensteinian 
account of art as an indefinable open-concept (as opposed to a definable closed-concept) 
thereby exemplifies a new distinction: that between so-called definability and conceptuality  
(or concept-type), where the former follows from the latter.16 
Shusterman’s characteristics 1 and 2 (analyticity and anti-idealism) combine to give 
AA its place within the philosophical landscape, and this contributes to Silvers’ clarity thesis. 
Characteristic 3 (anti-essentialism) obviously contributes to the anti-essentialism thesis. 
These likewise indicate Lamarque’s first and second provisos, respectively: the first involved 
the initial steps in delineating the domain of aesthetics from the domain of the philosophy of 
art, and thus, disentangling and clarifying the concepts they subsume; and the second 
involved the denial of some single essence among the various forms of art, thereby 
permitting their categorical subdivision. Characteristic 6 (metacriticism) indicates the third 
proviso: the formation of the philosophy of art criticism. Together, these points constitute 
the crux of AA, at least as it was initially envisioned.17  
The texts I have so far considered are external to or retrospective of AA; they are 
neither primary texts from its heyday nor contemporaneous commentary. One may expect 
that, given their hindsight and piecemeal mention of both earlier figures (e.g. Isenberg, 
Passmore, Gallie, and Weitz) and later figures (e.g. Danto, Goodman, and Wollheim), these 
texts would be inclusive of AA’s entire history. This, however, seems not to be the case. 
Though fundamental to a contemporary understanding of AA, these texts are not without 
their exceptions and disclaimers, where great analysts are excluded on account of some 
                                                          
11 Silvers (1987): 139. 
12 Davies (2013): 213; Weitz (1944, 1950): 3, 111. 
13 This is hardly exhaustive; cf., e.g., Weitz (1956), Gaut (2000), Lopes (2008), respectively.  
14 Diffey (1973): 103; Gallie (1948), Weitz (1956), Kennick (1958) are here identified as exemplary anti-essentialists.  
15 Cf. Diffey (1973): 103.  
16 Weitz (1956); cf. §3.1.3. 
17 Cf. §1.1.2. 
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stipulation or another; e.g. Moore, Wittgenstein, Dewey, Beardsley. It seems, therefore, that 
we are in need of a proper demarcation of scope.  
I take my initial cue from Shusterman (1989), who holds what I take to be the proper 
point of departure in determining the scope of AA:18 
 
“Certainly we want at least to start with a conception of the field that is 
wide enough to include the aesthetic writings of Goodman, Danto, and 
Wollheim, even if their more reformatory and speculative aesthetic 
doctrines make them less paradigmatically analytic aestheticians than the 
likes of Weitz, Isenberg, or Sibley.” 
 
As noted by Shusterman (1987, 1989), there are three construals of scope applicable to AA, 
both historically and philosophically considered:19 
 
1  Broad scope: The inclusion of all aesthetical texts by analytic philosophers 
throughout the twentieth-century; this is the scope offered by Wolterstorff.20   
 
2  Narrow scope: The inclusion of all aesthetical texts by analytic philosophers who do 
not engage in constructionist definition; this is the scope offered by Urmson.21  
 
3 Narrower scope: The inclusion of some aesthetical texts by analytic philosophers 
who do not engage in constructionist definition and are situated within a given 
timeframe; this is the scope offered by Silvers.22  
 
Whereas broad scope affords AA breadth and variety, narrow scope affords it precision and 
argumentative focus, and so for narrower scope, still. Yet, the third construal of scope 
affords something that the first and second do not: the conception of AA as a specific 
programme.23 Despite its constellatory organization, and considering the manifesto-like spirit 
of its earliest texts, I find that this is the proper conception of AA to have. However, it, as 
presented by Silvers, is exclusionary to many, including some of the most influential aesthetic 
analysts of the twentieth century. I shall therefore, in my adoption and adaptation of 
narrower scope, entertain a significant organizational shift.  
 
1.1.1 Statement of the Early-Late Distinction in Anglophone Aesthetics 
All three of the scopes noted above make the same assumptive error. This is the assumption 
that AA was a monophasic programme, consisting of a single movement without internal 
reform. I shall argue for AA as an (at least) biphasic programme, consisting of two 
movements, internally reformed by factors generating out of the analytic and linguistic turns, 
and yet consistent in their methodological pushes against idealism.  
                                                          
18 Shusterman (1989): 3.  
19 Shusterman (1987, 1989): 116, 3.  
20 Wolterstorff (1987, 1989): 152-153, 34-35. 
21 Urmson (1989): 22. 
22 Silvers (1987): 137-138. 
23 Shusterman (1987, 1989): 116, 3.  
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I take my cue also from Silvers (1987), who firstly identifies the whole of AA as 
exemplified by a shortlist of collections (Isenberg (1950), Elton (1954), and Margolis (1962)) 
throughout a stipulated span of sixteen years (1946-1962).24 This, I shall consider the early 
phase of AA. She then secondly identifies AA as a failed programme, replaced by  
‘more substantive developments’ exemplified by Danto (1964) and Goodman (1968) 
throughout the 1960s on.25 This, I shall consider the late phase of AA. Like Silvers, I shall 
largely characterize the phases of AA according to the texts exemplary of them;  
my conception of a biphasic AA may therefore be outlined as follows:  
 
1 Early Anglophone Aesthetics (EAA): The first phase of AA, exemplified by works 
published 1946-1965, specifically (but not limited to) Isenberg’s report Analytical 
Aesthetics and the Study of Art (1950) and its associated texts, the Elton collection 
Aesthetics and Language (1954), the Margolis collection Philosophy Looks at the Arts 
(1962), and the Barrett collection Collected Papers on Aesthetics (1965). Extension is 
perhaps permitted to include the Tilghman collection Language and Aesthetics (1973).  
 
2 Late Anglophone Aesthetics (LAA): The second of AA, exemplified by works 
published 1964-1988, specifically (but not limited to) Danto’s paper The Artworld 
(1964) and its associated texts, Goodman’s Languages of Art (1968) and, by 
extension, Ways of Worldmaking (1978), Wollheim’s Art and Its Objects (1968) and, by 
extension, On Art and the Mind (1972) and Painting as an Art (1987), as well as 
Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe (1988).26 
 
Where Silvers marks the failed end of AA in toto, I mark the shift from EAA to LAA.27  
What constituted and contributed to this shift is the topic of this dissertation,28 and so shall 
not be considered presently. EAA, its texts and its issues, are discussed in chapter 3; LAA, its 
texts and its issues, are discussed in chapter 4. A final statement is then given in chapter 5. 
Yet now that scope has been properly demarcated, I turn to a preliminary account of what I 
shall designate pre-AA aesthetics, including primers on EAA and LAA themselves.  
 
1.1.2 A Primer on Anglophone Aesthetics and Analytic Philosophy 
The AA programme, both historically and philosophically, constitutes a lesser moment 
within the greater context of the tradition called ‘analytic’ in philosophy. Likewise an upshot 
of the AT and LT, the analytic tradition entailed a common push against idealism through an 
adoption of a metaphysical realism that followed from enquiry into the logical structure of 
                                                          
24 Silvers (1987): 137-138; endnotes 3-7. Silvers quietly extends this to Barrett (1965) also; endnote 10.  
25 Silvers (1987): 137, 148.  
26 I exclude Walton from this dissertation, given that he is noted among LAA figures less and by fewer, as 
compared to Danto, Goodman, and Wollheim; Walton is included here simply on account of his mention by 
Gardner (2014) (cf. §1.1.5).  
27 It has not escaped my notice that there is overlap (1965/1964) between the phases; indeed, this is intentional 
on two counts. Firstly, it is intended to account for a gradual rather than sudden shift from EAA to LAA. 
Secondly, it is intended to account for the historio-philosophical genealogy of AA. The dates, per phase, are 
determined according to the publication years of its principle texts; this one-year overlap permits my inclusion 
of Danto’s 1964 text within LAA and Barrett’s 1965 collection within EAA, where each is better 
philosophically fit. The EAA-LAA distinction is therefore not historically-based, but philosophically-based, 
such that the projects and approaches of EAA are rendered prior to the projects and approaches of LAA. 
28 This should entail a defense of why AA is improperly characterised as ‘failed’ c. 1962, and how 
contemporaneous work is more properly characterised as ‘LAA’ than (e.g.) ‘post-AA’. 
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language and reality as constituted by a new catalogue of entities, external to and distinct 
from the mind -- and thus objectively real rather than subjectively ideal. Of note are the 
figures:29 Moore, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein; however, as only Moore30 and 
Wittgenstein31 wrote explicitly on aesthetics, I will limit any discussion to them, with Moore 
being of immediate concern (as Wittgenstein shall permeate much of this dissertation). 
Twentieth-century analytical philosophy is said to have begun with Moore’s seminal 
The Nature of Judgment (1899). Here he concludes the idealist doctrine -- i.e. that the content of 
a judgment is itself partly ideational -- to yield infinite regress, requiring for each primary 
judgment secondary and tertiary judgments, ad infinitum,32 and so offers instead a realist 
metaphysics wherein the content  of a judgment is something fully non-ideational. According 
to this common sense or naïve realism, the contents or objects of judgments are to be 
propositions, propositions to be complexes of concepts in relations, and concepts to be the 
stuff of reality:33 
 
“A proposition is a synthesis of concepts; and, just as concepts are themselves 
immutably what they are, so they stand in infinite relations to one another 
equally immutable. A proposition is constituted by any number of concepts, 
together with a specific relation between them; and according to the nature of 
this relation the proposition may be either true or false.” 
 
In his Refutation of Idealism (1903a), Moore iterates this through his discussion of ‘blue’ as being 
not the content of the sensation or consciousness of blue but rather a separately existent 
non-ideational concept, BLUE.34 In Principia Ethica (1903b), Moore reiterates much the same 
through his discussion of ‘yellow’ as YELLOW,35 which he identifies to be logically simple and 
as such indefinable and unanalyzable; likewise for ‘good’ itself.36 The indefinability and 
unanalyzability of GOODNESS is symptom of its logical simplicity, given that “the most 
important sense of ‘definition’ is that in which a definition states...the parts which invariably 
compose a certain whole; and in this sense ‘good[ness]’ has no definition because it is simple 
and has no parts.”37 It is by the metric of unanalyzable goodness that one determines a 
thing’s intrinsic value, as an end-in-itself, as opposed to its instrumental value, as a means-to-an-
end, according to what may be called the method of absolute isolation: “to consider what things 
are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their 
                                                          
29 Throughout this dissertation, discussion of particular figures has been informed and aided by Guyer (2014):  
A History of Modern Aesthetics, specifically volume III, The Twentieth Century; this shall be implicitly maintained, 
unless explicitly cited otherwise. Reference to primary texts has been cited as such; conclusions unique to Guyer 
have been cited as such. 
30 On Moore, cf. Guyer (2014): 110-115. 
31 On Wittgenstein, cf. Guyer (2014): 432-448.  
32 Moore (1899): 178.  
33 Moore (1899): 180; formatted. 
34 Moore (1903a): 447, 450. 
35 Moore (1903b): 10.  
36 Moore (1903b): 9-10. Note, however, that this does not preclude the definability of ‘the good’, i.e. ‘that which is 
good’, as some definition of this is ‘the fundamental question of Ethics’. (8-9; 184)  
37 Moore (1903b): 9.  
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existence to be good.”38 Here, we find inspiration for the non-contextuality characteristic of 
AA; however, despite his isolationist methodology and the atomism it prompts, Moore’s 
metaethics, indeed his metaesthetics also, entails a fundamental holism, given the import of 
his principle of organic unities:39 
 
The intrinsic value of a whole bears no regular proportion to the sum of the 
values of its parts, must not be assumed to do, and thus differs in amount 
 
where an organic unity is such a whole.40 Accordingly, Moore offers a hierarchical ontology, 
wherein (1) beautiful objects, being first-order organic unities, complex in (2) consciousness 
with certain other constituents -- (3) appropriate emotions and (4) true beliefs, particularly in 
response to (5) representational content depictive of (6) real objects -- to yield greater second-
order organic unities, collectively called (7) aesthetic enjoyments.41 Given that the beautiful 
and the aesthetic are themselves organic unities, so defined by their intrinsic value, Moorean 
aesthetics, indeed ethics also, becomes indexed to ‘good’. We therefore come to Moore’s 
definition of ‘the beautiful’, which he links with his definition of the predicate ‘is beautiful’, 
and thus the concept BEAUTY:42 
 
“[T]he beautiful should be defined as that of which the admiring contemplation 
is good in itself [...] if our definition be correct...it leaves only one unanalysable 
predicate of value, namely ‘good,’ while ‘beautiful,’ though not identical with, is 
to be defined by reference to this, being thus, at the same time, different from 
and necessarily connected with it. In short,...to say that a thing is beautiful is to 
say, not indeed that it is itself good, but that it is a necessary element in 
something which is: to prove that a thing is truly beautiful is to prove that a 
whole, to which it bears a particular relation as a part, is truly good.” 
 
Moore maintains the anti-essentialist position that “there can be no single criterion of beauty”, 
given that no beautiful object (qua organic unity) may be so defined by a part of its whole43 -- 
beauty and thus art does not contain goodness, so much as it functionally indexes to goodness.  
* * * 
Moore’s aesthetics finds interesting contrast with Croce’s,44 whose idealist aesthetics largely 
constituted the target against which AA pitted its common push. I shall present its 
organization and theses here, generally, as a function of the distinctions of which the 
Crocean ‘Philosophy of the Spirit’ admits.  
In Aesthetics (1902), Croce adopts and adapts the Kantian distinction between  
(1) theoretical and (2) practical epistemic domains, which admit of a ‘double degree’ paralleled 
                                                          
38 Moore (1903b): 187. 
39 Adapted from Moore (1903b): 27, 28, 36; three various formulations.  
40 Moore (1903b): 36.  
41 Admittedly, this prompts Moore to draw a number of striking conclusions; cf. Guyer (2014): 111, 114. 
42 Moore (1903b): 201-202. 
43 Moore (1903b): 202; formatted.  
44 On Croce, cf. Guyer (2014): 128-149.  
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between them.45 The former involves the distinction between: (1) intuition, immediate 
knowledge of particulars, and (2) concept, mediate knowledge of universals;46 the latter 
involves the distinction between: (3) self-regarding action, and (4) others-regarding action. 
This begets Croce’s division of the four philosophical domains: (1) aesthetics, concerning 
particulars, (2) logic, concerning universals, (3) economics, concerning self-regarding action, and 
(4) ethics, concerning others-regarding action.47 These are exhaustive;48 a fifth does not exist, 
though may perhaps be manufactured out of combinations of the four fundamentals  
(e.g. the representation of universals in art as the aesthetico-logical).49 Given these strict 
distinctions, art admits neither of theses (rules) nor of types (kinds),50 as such would entail 
transmutation from the domain of aesthetics to logic. Thus, it is on account of his 
assignment of the matters of aesthetics to theoretical (not practical) intuitive (not conceptual) 
particular (not universal) knowledge that Croce identifies art as expression, given the identity of 
intuition with expression and thus its particularity:51 
 
“To intuit is to express; and nothing else (nothing more, but nothing less) than 
to express. [...] Every expression is a single expression. Activity is a fusion of the 
impressions in an organic whole...the work of art should have unity, or,  
what amounts to the same thing, unity in variety. Expression is a synthesis of the 
various, or multiple, in the one.” 
 
The Crocean notion of unity in variety is the same as the Moorean notion of organic unity;52  
that is, it describes a certain part-whole relation such that the value of the whole differs from 
that of its summed parts. For Croce, as for Moore, this difference is not merely an  
‘other-than’ relation, but a ‘greater-than’ relation, such that some element is added to the 
multiplicity for its organization into a unity. This element is form, as distinct from content;  
“the aesthetic fact, therefore, is form, and nothing but form.”53 Beauty, so defined, is this 
(successful) expression, given that ‘the beautiful’ presents as the unity produced by expressive 
action;54 as such, beauty then becomes the signifier of art. Like Moore’s ‘good’, Croce’s 
‘beautiful’ (and by extension, expression) is logically simple and unanalyzable, not admitting 
of degree or distinction.55 Surely, per Croce, artworks (as artefacts) admit of empirical classes, 
                                                          
45 Croce (1902): 55. 
46 Croce (1902): 1.  
47 Guyer (2014): 129. 
48 Croce (1902): 61-62.  
49 Croce (1902): 33. Croce offers numerous admixtures of epistemic domains: e.g. the juridical as economico-logical 
(62), the religious as ethico-historio-logical (63), etc.; likewise, whereas art is the product of intuition (qua aesthetic) 
thereby granting the phenomenon, and science or philosophy is the product of concept (qua logic) thereby 
granting the noumenon, history is the product of intuition-plus-concept (31).  
50 Croce (1902): 33-34. 
51 Croce (1902): 11, 20; formatted.  
52 Guyer (2014): 135. 
53 Croce (1902): 16; formatted.  
54 Croce (1902): 79.  
55 Croce (1902): 79, 67; Guyer (2014): 138-139.  
 
21 
 
but this is an upshot of the ‘physical fact’ (viz. d) of art which merely accompanies the  
‘aesthetic fact’ (viz. b):56 
 
“The complete process of aesthetic production can be symbolized in four 
stages, which are: (a) impressions; (b) expression or spiritual aesthetic synthesis; 
(c) hedonistic accompaniment, or pleasure of the beautiful (aesthetic pleasure); 
(d) translation of the aesthetic fact into physical phenomena [...] [T]he only one 
that is properly speaking aesthetic and truly real, is in b...” 
 
Attempts at analysis of such empirical classes within the aesthetic domain -- e.g.57 theories of 
the ‘artistic and literary kinds’, ‘elementary forms of the beautiful’, ‘objective conditions of 
the beautiful’, ‘classification of the arts’, or ‘union of the arts’ -- or within the linguistic 
domain -- e.g.58 theories of ‘elementary linguistic facts’ or ‘unity of the language’ -- fail,  
as they entail confusions between these two facts, namely: of the former for the latter.  
Given that they take a common object, expression (qua aesthetic fact), Croce claims identity 
between Aesthetic and Linguistic, i.e. that the science or philosophy of art and that of 
language are in fact synonymous.59 Thus, by Croce’s conclusion that “the work of art  
(the aesthetic work) is always internal [ideal, ‘aesthetic’]; and what is called external  
[physical, ‘artistic’] is no longer a work of art,” we come to the crux of Croce’s idealist 
aesthetics: the ideality, not only of art, but of the artwork itself.60 By eliminating the import of 
the physical artwork, Croce denies the realist attitudes that are to take prominence 
throughout twentieth-century aesthetics, as well as the hallmarks of AA,61 most notably the 
Passmorean subdivision of the philosophy of art itself, according to art’s empirical classes.  
 
1.1.3 A Primer on Early Anglophone Aesthetics  
In his introduction, Elton (1954) names the task of his collection to be clarificatory, 
specifically of confusions in aesthetics said to be “mainly linguistic in origin”,62 and identifies 
four sources of these confusions within then-current aesthetics. The sources are:63 
 
1 Generality: that neither ‘art’ nor ‘aesthetics’ names one thing, necessarily; 
 
2 Essentialism: that the arts themselves differ greatly; 
 
3 Misleading analogy: that analogy with (e.g.) ethics and science mistakes aesthetic 
judgments as comparable to non-aesthetic judgments; 
 
4 Tautology or apriority: that the exclusive emphasis of one aesthetic feature renders a 
theory tautologous and irrefutable.  
 
                                                          
56 Croce (1902): 96; formatted.  
57 Cf. Croce (1902): 35-36, 108, 108-109, 114-115, 115-116 (resp.). 
58 Croce (1902): 149, 150.  
59 Croce (1902): 142-143. 
60 Croce (1902): 51.  
61 Cf. Elton (1954): 6-7. 
62 Elton (1954): 1; formatted.  
63 Elton (1954): 3-4. 
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Notice that Elton’s sources 1 and 2 hold closely together, with 1 reflected in Silvers’ second 
thesis, and 2 reflected in her third thesis as well as Shusterman’s characteristic 3. A diagnosis 
of this sort finds inspiration in the collections by Flew titled Logic and Language, first series 
(1951) and second series (1953), with third series titled Conceptual Analysis (1956), as well as 
the influential collection by Stevenson titled Ethics and Language (1944). Of course,  
of grandest influence was the late-Wittgenstein (1953), which Tilghman (1973) does well to 
emphasize explicitly,64 though all EAA editors somehow note by identifying their content 
with the philosophical analysts: Moore, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. Whereas Elton does 
so more generally,65 Margolis (1962) attributes this to methods,66 and Barrett (1965) to questions 
rather than to methods or conclusions,67 said to be distinctly analytical. In fact,  
such questions are often deemed “logical, conceptual, and epistemological” rather than 
uniquely aesthetic.68 A general trend among these collections which characterize EAA is a 
rethinking of the very possibilities of details thought fundamental to pre-AA aesthetics, 
including: the aesthetic domain itself,69 the aesthetic point-of-view,70 and definitions of ‘art’ 
or ‘artwork’.71 In fact, Margolis concedes “no simple logical differences” among the (e.g.) 
scientific, ethical, and aesthetic domains, instead offering “clusters or classes of reasons that would 
be relevant to each of these sorts of judgment” as that which facilitates the demarcation of 
‘neat categories’, to whatever degree this might be possible.72 Nevertheless, commonalities 
indeed arise, oftentimes stated as negative theses, as is noted by Barrett:73 
 
“It is assumed, therefore, that the proper course to take in aesthetics is to avoid 
generality and the pursuit of ‘laws of art’, such as the ‘unities’. [...] This has been 
the most significant development in the aesthetics of this group...” 
 
Such rejection of ‘unities’ (in whichever sense) is perhaps most adamantly phrased in terms 
of a rejection of philosophical-aesthetical systems (in whichever sense):74 
 
“[A]estheticians, and, for that matter, philosophers generally, should declare a 
moratorium on all-embracing systems, and tackle particular problems [...] in so far as 
they are not system-builders and are more concerned with clarifying ideas than 
with constructing elaborate theories...” 
 
Likewise, distinction between AA and pre-AA aesthetics is facilitated by rejecting the use of 
aesthetical writings to, per Margolis, ‘round-out’ philosophical systems,75 and per Tilghman, 
                                                          
64 Tilghman (1973): 1, 5.  
65 Elton (1954): 11.  
66 Margolis (1962): 3. 
67 Barrett (1965): viii.  
68 Barrett (1965): viii.  
69 Margolis (1962): 12.  
70 Margolis (1962): 46. 
71 Margolis (1962): 47. 
72 Margolis (1962): 12; formatted.  
73 Barrett (1965): ix. 
74 Barrett (1965): vii; formatted. Clarification of these terms is a topic of this dissertation.  
75 Margolis (1962): 6.  
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construct metaphysical systems.76 For the EAA editors, the proper use of aesthetics is 
discursive, involving the clarification of conceptual problems that arise through aesthetical 
language and the formulation of precise and analytically-minded questions by which such 
aesthetical discourse may be had.  
 
1.1.4 A Primer on Late Anglophone Aesthetics 
Danto (1964), Goodman (1968), and Wollheim (1968) subvert the moratorium described by 
Barrett, each devising systems -- by which particular aesthetic problems or questions could 
be clarified and investigated. In this way, contra Barrett, LAA figures are indeed  
‘system-builders’ as such, but per Barrett, their systems are not ‘all-embracing’; rather, they 
are qualified by the same interests that informed the methods and questions characteristic of 
EAA, namely, those that are distinctly analytical as a function of language and its entailments: 
(e.g.) meaning, reference, use, and logical ontology or epistemology; again, of grandest 
influence was the late-Wittgenstein (1953).77 Despite this sort of commonality, the systems 
that these figures devise differ greatly among themselves: Danto’s being historically-narrative; 
Goodman’s being symbolic; and Wollheim’s being psychological. I shall note each in turn.  
Danto (1964) identifies his project with an attempt to make sense of pop art, then, the 
latest artistic modernist idiom. For Danto, to make sense of a new art form was to make sense 
of a new art theory, conceived as a new art definition,78 and therefore notes his “aim has been 
essentialist -- to find a definition of art everywhere and always true,” consisting in “a real 
definition...laying out the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to fall under a 
concept”, i.e. ART.79 Adopting an historicist framework, he locates this new definition in 
relational rather than manifest properties, as would traditionally be done, thereby devising a 
historio-cultural system called ‘the artworld’.80  
Goodman (1968) identifies his project with an attempt to devise “an approach to a 
general theory of symbols,” where the term ‘symbol’ includes (e.g.) letters, words, texts, pictures, 
diagrams, maps, models, (etc.), and ‘language’ constitutes a ‘symbol system’.81 For Goodman, 
to symbolize is to refer, and so, his theory of symbols is a theory of reference, where the system 
generated through the interaction of those symbols is governed by both syntactic and 
semantic rules. This is not a function particular to art, but is common to both the aesthetic 
and scientific domains, given that symbol systems are means by which we construct the 
world (viz. worldmaking), in ordinary, not only aesthetic, experience. 
Wollheim (1968) identifies his project with an attempt to reconcile the conflict of 
simultaneously attributing representational properties to an artwork while considering that 
                                                          
76 Tilghman (1973): 4.  
77 Cf. Guyer (2014): 427, 482, 508.  
78 Danto (1964): 572. 
79 Danto (1998): 128-129.    
80 Danto (1964): 580.  
81 Goodman (1968): xi-xii. 
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artwork to be a physical object. Wollheim’s representationalist outlook is demonstrated 
through his theory of representational seeing, described as a capacity of our perceptual apparatus 
to visualize, within the two-dimensional picture plane, three-dimensional pictorial space, wherein 
depicted objects are seen.82 This psychological capacity has the dual-character of “attend[ing] 
simultaneously to object and medium,” called twofoldness.83 
 
1.1.5 A Problem in Anglophone Aesthetics 
There are many trends that one may observe between EAA and LAA. Among these, and of 
particular importance and interest, are the shifts in methodology pertaining to: essentialism, 
metaphysics, and systematicity. It appears that, for all three of these notions, their explicit 
reprobation in EAA waned unto their explicit approbation in LAA. If AA is to be viewed as 
a consistent albeit biphasic programme, then something seems amiss; a problem arises with 
respect to the attitudes concerning essentialism, metaphysics, and systematicity.  
This problem has not passed unnoticed, however. In his introductory essays, 
Shusterman (1987, 1989) identifies this shift, from reprobation to approbation, toward 
essentialist methodologies. His conclusion is that EAA entailed an implicit essentialism by 
way of “the idea that there is or must be one essential or proper interpretive logic  
(whether objectivist, relativist, noncognitivist, etc.) which underlies all good criticism.”84 
What follows is that this emerged within LAA. Likewise, in a recent paper titled Method and 
Metaphysics in the Philosophy of Art (2014), Gardner identifies the same shift, from reprobation 
to approbation, toward metaphysical methodologies. His conclusion is that EAA entailed an 
implicit general metaphysics by way of “a position of passive acquiescence in, if not active 
subscription to, naturalism.”85 Again, what follows is that this emerged within LAA  
(thereby contributing to adjacent disciplines such as empirical aesthetics and neuroesthetics).  
It is in this paper that Gardner identifies the same shift, yet again, from reprobation to 
approbation, toward systematic methodologies:86  
 
“The outlook of analytic aesthetics dictates...that issues in aesthetics be 
approached without reliance on a comprehensive and systematic set of 
general, substantive philosophical principles and doctrines... 
 
[Yet] analytic aesthetics now includes in its own history several striking 
attempts at system building or at any rate comprehensive systematic 
elucidation of the arts: Nelson Goodman, Richard Wollheim, Arthur 
Danto, Kendall Walton.” 
 
Here, however, he attempts no resolution of this problem. I take the first portion of this 
quotation to concern EAA and the second portion to concern LAA. We are, in effect, 
                                                          
82 Wollheim (1968): 16, 17; (1980b): 209. 
83 Wollheim (1980b): 213.  
84 Shusterman (1987, 1989): 122, 14-15.  
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reminded of Shusterman’s claim concerning the point of departure for the demarcation of 
scope. Again, if AA is to be viewed as a consistent biphasic programme, then an explanation 
for this shift is required. Whether this explanation (for systematicity) is to share the same 
kind of conclusion made by Shusterman (for essentialism) and Gardner (for metaphysics), 
namely, that EAA entailed an implicit systematicity that emerged within LAA, is the topic of 
this dissertation.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Thesis 
Problem. As it stands, the above quotation exposes a problematic methodological tension 
between the early and late phases of AA. Paraphrasing Gardner’s formulation yields the 
following shift -- from non-systematic to systematic methodologies: 
 
The outlook of EAA dictates that issues in aesthetics be approached, 
philosophically speaking, non-systematically... 
 
Yet LAA includes in its own history several attempts at approaching 
issues in aesthetics systematically: Goodman, Wollheim, Danto, Walton. 
 
This tension between EAA and LAA may manifest with various possible strengths, 
including: as an inconsistency (in its weaker sense) or as a contradiction (in its stronger sense) 
between the two phases.87 Given the paradoxical ‘S and not-S’ structure of this formulation, a 
stronger reading of the tension as contradiction seems arguable; however, given that this 
dissertation concerns AA as a consistent programme, it is sufficient to argue a weaker reading 
of the tension as mere inconsistency. Call this the Problem of Systematic Inconsistency (PSI) 
in anglophone aesthetics. It is this problem that I aim to investigate and resolve as an 
apparent problem, resolving it as neither contradictory nor inconsistent, despite its prima facie 
appearance as so. I shall accomplish this through comparative elucidation of the concepts 
ANALYTICITY and SYSTEMATICITY, as contextualized within the early and late phases of 
anglophone aesthetics. 
Yet, a preliminary issue arises. Upon first-glance, the paraphrase seems innocuous 
enough. Upon second-glance, however, it may seem that this shift itself has, in error, 
metamorphosed away from its original formulation. It is my preliminary duty, then, to 
provide a third-glance which shows this to be an appropriate metamorphosis. 
Gardner’s claim (call this G) entails a reprobative-approbative shift w.r.t. some entity, 
namely systematicity (call this s); i.e. EAA poses a negative claim, and LAA poses a positive 
claim, w.r.t. s. G is therefore an evaluative shift w.r.t. a single entity, s. Gardner’s paraphrased 
claim (call this G′) entails an approbative evaluation w.r.t. the entities constituting the  
non-systematicity/systematicity shift (call these s* and s); i.e. EAA poses a positive claim 
w.r.t. s* and LAA poses a positive claim w.r.t. s. G′ is therefore a constitutive shift w.r.t. two 
                                                          
87 This is hardly exhaustive. Varying readings of principal AA texts yield varying possible strengths of its tensions; 
these are not considered here. The formulation considered here is a minimal PSI.  
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different entities, s* and s. It therefore appears as though the first-order shifts noted by G 
and G′ undergo a second-order shift (call this G″) from evaluative to constitutive matters, 
skewing the discussion. This is our view from the second-glance.  
AA was not merely a diagnostic programme,88 however, and so must entail some 
corrective if it is to be properly contextualized within the analytic tradition. For this reason, 
G is mistaken to limit EAA as merely claiming a negative evaluation of s, and G′ is mistaken 
to limit EAA as merely claiming a positive evaluation of s*; rather, the methodological claims 
of EAA in G and G′ are to be supplemented with a replacement methodology (call this m) or 
set of methodologies (call this M). The negative claim of G w.r.t. s is therefore synonymous 
with the positive claim of G′ w.r.t. s*, such that the target of both is a positive claim w.r.t. m 
or M. In emphasizing this, we therefore iterate the implicit claim of G that a reprobation of s 
entails an approbation of m, and reiterate the explicit claim of G′ that an approbation of s* 
also entails an approbation of m. Both G and G′ (and thus G″) are therefore fundamentally 
constitutive, not evaluative, shifts -- despite both also involving an evaluative dimension;  
G″ no longer skews the discussion. This is our view from the third-glance. 
It is the task of this dissertation to show that the two entities s* and s in G′, which 
prima facie present the tension noted above, are in fact not the same but different entities -- 
i.e. different conceptualizations of systematicity (call these s1* and s2). Yet, at present this 
tension (as inconsistency) stands. 
 
Thesis. Formally stated, the thesis of this dissertation is taxonomical. It entails both generic 
and specific theses, where the former implies the latter. The generic thesis is that the 
problem of systematic inconsistency in anglophone aesthetics is merely an apparent problem, 
which is to say, is resolvable. The specific thesis is tripartite: (1) that the call to  
non-systematicity in early anglophone aesthetics was mistaken; (2) that this was actually a call 
for a new systematicity; and (3) that this emerged in late anglophone aesthetics. Fundamental 
to these theses is the notion of a Shusterman-Gardner type conclusion, namely, that EAA 
entailed an implicit systematicity that emerged within LAA. It is in virtue of this implicit 
systematicity within EAA, and its mere emergence in LAA, that the shift in phase is rendered 
neither inconsistent (on the weaker reading) nor contradictory (on the stronger reading), and 
thus PSI rendered resolvable.   
This dynamic may be iterated in the following way: both the early and late phases of 
AA entailed both analytic and systematic elements; yet whereas EAA positioned analysis as 
primary and system as secondary, LAA positioned system as primary and analysis as 
secondary. The shift in phase was merely a swapping of priority between these two methods. 
In the following chapter, I shall turn to a case-study as a means to illustrate and so concretize 
the thesis of this dissertation and the dynamic it involves. 
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1.3 Analysis, Synthesis, and System in Analytic Philosophy  
What follows is a preliminary catalogue of the major modes of analysis, synthesis, and system 
characterizable of the tradition called ‘analytic’ in philosophy; these shall serve as the means 
by which the analytic and systematic methods of AA, throughout both EAA and LAA, are to 
be elucidated.  
Perhaps most fundamental is analysis as regression; this is presented by Beaney (2002) 
as an introduction to analysis as such.89 In this most general formulation, analysis entails, for 
any given x, the tracing of a sequence of conditionals, such that if x be positioned at step 5, 
steps 1-4 may be regarded as the concomitants of 5 unto 1; likewise, synthesis entails, for any 
given y, the same tracing, such that if y be positioned at step 1, steps 2-5 may be regarded as 
the concomitants of 1 unto 5. This is shown below:  
 
-analysis y-=--→--→--→--→--=-x synthesis- 
 
For each analytic step, i.e. working backward to each antecedent, there exists a synthetic step, 
i.e. working forward to each consequent. Thus, wherever one notes a method of (e.g.) 
‘regressive analysis’, perhaps one may also note a method of (e.g.) ‘progressive synthesis’; no doubt 
synthesis admits of varieties also, and one might well suspect that they, at least partly, 
correspond to the varieties of analysis, as converses. System, however, concerns interrelations 
of the sequence itself, both part-part and part-whole (etc.), rather than the analytic-synthetic 
means by which it is devised; it therefore relates to analysis more obliquely. It is for this 
reason that I shall, at present, not differentiate between analysis and synthesis, but rather 
between analysis and system -- or perhaps our targets: analyticity and systematicity.  
 
1.3.1 A Primer on Analysis  
Regarding the varieties of analysis, I take my cue from a series of texts by Beaney, including: 
Decompositions and Transformations (2002), from which derived Conceptions of Analysis (2007b) 
and The Analytic Turn (2007a), both in a collection of the same name; as well as a lecture titled 
The Analytic Revolution (2015).90 Throughout these sources, Beaney distinguishes three modes 
of analysis at play throughout twentieth-century analytic philosophy. The modes are:91  
 
1 Regressive analysis: the derivation of something by way of its premises, principles, 
causes, etc.; this may involve a genealogical strategy.  
 
2 Resolutive analysis: the identification of the elementary or structural constituents of 
something; this may involve a reductivist strategy. 
                                                          
89 Cf. Beaney (2002): 55-56. 
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28 
 
 
3 Transformative analysis: the translation of something into a new specified scheme; 
this may involve an eliminativist strategy. 
 
Where mode 2 admits of further distinction:92 
 
1 Whole-part (Russellian) analysis: the decompositional resolution of a complex 
(whole) into its atomic constituents (parts).  
 
2 Function-argument (Fregean) analysis: the resolution of a complex into an argument, 
(rather than subject) and a function (rather than predicate) that acts as the logical 
operator (rather than introducing a copula, e.g. ‘is’).  
 
And admitting of two general methodological classes, with mode 2 (and perhaps 1) 
privileged by the first, and mode 3 privileged by the second:93  
 
1 Reductive analysis (analysis-as-reduction): analysis which aims to identify the deep-
structural elements of a given complex that are logically or metaphysically 
primitive; this reflects ‘new-level’ analysis. 
 
2 Paraphrastic analysis (analysis-as-rephrasal): analysis which aims to clarify surface-
structural grammatical form and in so doing correct the problems it generates; this 
reflects ‘same-level’ analysis.  
 
Distinguishable as the above though they may be, Beaney maintains that all three analytic 
modes (and their distinctions) are, in practice, typically to some degree mixed, and that it is 
only where one mode is determinably dominant that one may speak of that mode of analysis; 
thus, in theory, these fundamental modes admit of various combinations and realizations, 
prompting other varieties of analysis throughout the movement called ‘analytic’ in 
philosophy.94 Nevertheless, one may indeed identify the analytic mode(s) characteristic of the 
AT, as first provided in Beaney (2002):95 
 
“What, I think, was genuinely new around the turn of the twentieth century... 
was the deliberate and extensive use of paraphrastic analysis [and t]he interpretive or 
transformative mode of analysis that this involves...” 
 
And second provided in Beaney (2007a):96 
 
“[R]ebellion against British idealism...led to the more complex form of analysis... 
combining transformative logical analysis with decompositional metaphysical analysis. What 
characterizes the analytic turn in giving rise to analytic philosophy, then, was 
this synthesis of two forms of analysis, and what has characterized analytic philosophy 
ever since is the continually developing syntheses of forms of analysis...” 
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Here, Beaney presents a rather telling shift. In the former, he identifies a simpler assessment 
of the AT, as characterizable by a single general mode: the transformative mode of  
analysis-as-rephrasal (mode 2); yet, in the latter, he identifies a more complicated assessment 
of the AT, as characterizable by the synthesis of two general modes: the transformative mode 
of analysis-as-rephrasal and the resolutive (as whole-part) mode of analysis-as-reduction 
(modes 2 and 3). Given the admixture of analytic modes in general, a number of points arise: 
(1) the transformative-paraphrastic analysis noted in (2002) would involve the resolutive-
reductivist analysis noted in (2007a), though not to the same degree, i.e. the former being 
dominant over the latter. (2) The synthesis emphasized in (2007a) is either (2a) equal or  
(2b) unequal; in the former, both modes are co-dominant, and in the latter, one mode is 
dominant over the other. (2a) is inconsistent with (1), but (2b) may be either consistent or 
inconsistent with (1) depending upon the mode considered to be dominant, i.e. consistent if 
transformation-paraphrasis is dominant, or inconsistent if resolution-reduction is dominant. 
Chronology of the statements aside, I turn elsewhere in an attempt to settle these issues.  
In Analytic Philosophy: Beyond the Linguistic Turn and Back Again (2007), Hacker identifies 
four (perhaps five) phases of analytic philosophy, properly so called. The phases are:97  
 
1 The logical atomist phase: characterized by the dominance, first, of resolutive  
(as Russellian whole-part) analysis, and second, of transformative  
(as Fregean function-argument) analysis; for Russell, transformation reinforced 
resolution (in an eliminativist manner), for Frege, transformation was self-
important (in a reductivist manner).98 
 
2 The Cambridge analysis phase: characterized by the explicit distinction between 
paraphrastic and reductive analyses; this permitted logical (‘same-level’) analysis 
without metaphysical (‘new-level’) analysis and its concomitants, and “became the 
hallmark of the phase (or phases) of analytic philosophy that followed”.99 
 
3 The logical empiricist (Vienna Circle) phase: characterized by further non-reductive 
paraphrastic alternatives, generally for ‘the logic of scientific language’.100 
 
4 The Oxford analysis phase: characterized by further non-reductive paraphrastic 
alternatives, generally through the analysis of grammar, ‘rules-of-use’.101 
 
5 The logical pragmatist phase: characterized by the search for a new theory of meaning 
for natural language.102 
 
Given the paraphrastic-reductive distinction devised in phase 3, Hacker maintains that the 
LT, rather than the AT tout court, characterizes phases 3 and 4 (and 5),103 and defines it 
according to the following propositions:104 
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“(1) that the goal of philosophy is (a) the understanding of the structure and 
articulations of our conceptual scheme, and (b) the resolution of the problems 
of philosophy (to be specified by paradigmatic examples)...; (2) that a primary 
method of philosophy is the examination of the uses of words in order to disentangle 
conceptual confusions; (3) that philosophy is not a contribution to human 
knowledge about reality...but to a distinctive form of understanding.” 
 
Reading through the lenses of Beaney and Hacker (whose distinction Beaney endorses),105  
I conclude with a position intermediately between Beaney (2002) and Beaney (2007a), stated 
above as (2b): the synthesis noted as characterizing the AT is ‘unequal’, involving a slight 
relative dominance of the transformative mode of paraphrastic analysis. This holds especially with regard 
to AA, for two reasons, one historical and one philosophical: (1) historically, EAA and LAA 
each coincide with phases 3-5 (and beyond), after which non-reductive modes of analysis 
were emphasized over reductive ones; (2) philosophically, EAA figures took themselves to 
be reprobative of the metaphysical interests that resolutive modes of reductive analysis 
entail,106 regardless of whether this was mistaken. For these reasons, at present, I shall 
categorize AA figures among the ‘second generation of analytic philosophers’, for whom 
non-reductive paraphrastic analysis was key.107 
 
1.3.2 A Primer on System  
A brief interjection. In order to describe what ‘system’ or ‘systematicity’ is to mean 
throughout this dissertation, I shall begin with a description of what it is not to mean.  
I shall call this ‘systematicity in the ordinary sense’, or: 
 
1* Ordinary systematicity: some element or set-of-elements is maintained as the system 
guide; the system is defined in terms of some procedure or classification that is to 
be followed regularly and methodically according to this guide; rule-following.  
 
Systematicity in the ordinary sense admits of (at least) two variants or moments:  
(1) a dynamic procedural systematicity, whereby a system is devised according to some 
stepwise activity, and (2) a static organizational systematicity, whereby a system is devised 
according to some hierarchical or chronological ordering. (I call these ‘moments’ because, 
oftentimes, the latter is a result of the former.) One is said to be ‘systematic’ in the ordinary 
sense when one follows a certain methodology, often according to a set-of-rules, thereby 
defining the ‘system’ as either (1) the methodical product, or (2) the set of methodical steps 
themselves, or (3) the methodical doing itself, or (4) some such combination; procedural 
systematicity defines the system according to 2 or 3, whereas organizational systematicity 
defines the system according to 1. As I shall soon demonstrate, I intend ‘systematicity’ in 
neither a procedural nor an organizational sense, but rather in a form-functional sense that is 
                                                          
105 Cf. Beaney (2007a): 5-6.  
106 Cf. §1.1.5 and Gardner (2014).  
107 Beaney (2002): 70, cf. endnote 31; (2007b): 200, cf. endnote 6.  
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indicative of the type of functionality maintained by the parts of a system in relation to the 
system whole. In ordinary systematicity, indeed in both its procedural and organizational 
variants, the onus is on relationships between parts, particularly immediate parts -- they entail 
‘part-part relations’ only; in the systematicity I shall soon introduce, indeed in each of its 
variants also, the onus is rather on relationships between parts and wholes, as well as among 
parts -- they entail ‘part-whole relations’. Given the topic of this dissertation, it is the latter that 
interests us.  
* * * 
Regarding the varieties of system, I take my cue from Winfield, who, in Systematic Aesthetics 
(1995), offers a neo-Hegelian defense of so-called ‘systematic’ aesthetic theories, thereby 
detailing what may constitute a system as such. He distinguishes three fundamental models 
of aesthetic theory at play throughout its history, defined according to the locus and function 
of ‘the standard of beauty’ within each. The types are:108 
 
1 Metaphysical aesthetics: search for ‘first principles’ via appeal to ‘privileged givens’ as non-
derivative and unconditioned standards; this locates beauty in antecedent objective 
reality, whereby aesthetics becomes mimēsis. 
 
2 Transcendental aesthetics: search for ‘conditions of knowing’ via appeal to ‘privileged 
determiner(s)’ as that which derives and confers validity upon other terms; this 
locates beauty in consequent subjective or intersubjective processes of reception, 
whereby aesthetics becomes a ‘critique of taste’.  
 
3 Systematic aesthetics: appeal to ‘self-determination’ whereby the system’s form and 
content are simultaneously generated through immanent categorical development and 
rational reconstruction, which together inform art criticism; this defines beauty as  
“the most general idea of aesthetic worth” and recognizes the ‘autonomy of art’.109  
 
Winfield concludes that the metaphysical and transcendental models fail, and do so on the 
grounds that appeals to privileged givens (model 1) or determiners (model 2) are self-
defeating with the latter reducing to the former.110 At fault is what Winfield describes as a 
“fundamental stumbling block of any foundationalism”, namely, the normative discrepancy 
between conferrer and conferred-upon.111 In fact, per Winfield, the failure of models 1 and 2 
is attributable to their foundationalist tendencies of privileging some entity and organizing 
their theories around it; whereas, the success of model 3 is attributable to the absence of any 
foundationalism (or anti-foundationalism) and its replacement with non-foundationalist self-
determination.112 As noted above, this involves two resources: rational reconstruction adopts 
terms from past aesthetic theories or traditions and rethinks them by determining their 
constituents, and antecedent and consequent elements,113 and adapting them into an 
                                                          
108 Winfield (1995): 4, 7; 7-8; 6, 9 (resp.).  
109 Winfield (1995): 70.  
110 Cf. Winfield (1995): 4-5.  
111 Winfield (1995): 5; formatted.  
112 Winfield (1995): 4-5.  
113 Winfield (1995): 64-66.  
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immanent categorial development, wherein terms follow one another according to their 
respective content, with prior terms providing sufficient conceptual prerequisites for the 
posterior terms that incorporate them; the development closes when one such term 
incorporates all prior terms, thereby comprising a totality or unity, free of extraneity.114 These 
together generate, and are defined by, what Winfield calls a “thoroughgoing systematicity”, 
whereby:115 
 
“[N]o term gets introduced until all its preconditions and constituents have 
already been established. As a consequence, the order in which topics are 
addressed is tied to their content, reflecting their constitutive position in the 
subject matter...” 
 
To initiate this, the ‘first task’ of any systematic aesthetics is to determine the starting point 
or minimal feature of art by identifying the minimal term that is incorporated by all subsequent 
terms and establishing its primitive role within the system.116 To qualify, this minimal term 
must contain no aesthetic constituents, that is, must be unanalyzable unto other aesthetic 
factors.117 Per Winfield, this term is ‘aesthetic worth in general’ qua beauty.118  
I take Winfield’s account, as reiterated here, to constitute a general or standard account of 
systematicity, against which we might compare alternatives, and by which we might emphasize 
a final point regarding varieties of system: all models 1, 2, and 3 constitute systems in a 
standard philosophical sense; however, only model 3 is characterized by Winfield as 
‘systematic’. This is because his use of ‘systematic’ is procedural, such that aesthetics is 
systematic when its formulation proceeds systematically through systematic processes  
(viz. immanent categorial development). This begets a difference in classification among the 
models: model 3 is classified by way of its process, and so is systematic in a way that tends 
toward the procedural (though not merely in the ‘ordinary’) sense; models 1 and 2 are 
classified by way of their organization, w.r.t. privileged entities, and so are systematic in a way 
that tends toward the organizational (though not merely in the ‘ordinary’) sense. Yet, per the 
‘interjection’ above, when viewed from the outlook that interests us -- form-functionally -- 
this difference in classification dissolves. The privilege attributed to givens and determiners 
in models 1 and 2 and primitiveness attributed to the minimal term in model 3 are 
functionally equivalent, acting as the kernel around which each system fixates. In effect,  
this anticipates the key systematic distinction made in the following chapter.119 
 
 
 
                                                          
114 Winfield (1995): 63-64.  
115 Winfield (1995): 6.  
116 Winfield (1995): 64-66, 67-68.  
117 Winfield (1995): 67-68.  
118 Winfield (1995): 70. 
119 Cf. §2.1.4. 
 
33 
 
1.4 Conclusion to Chapter 1 
In adopting and adapting a narrower scope, I entertain a significant organizational shift; 
namely, that AA is (at least) biphasic, and admits of earlier and later phases characterized by 
their exemplary texts -- Elton (1954), Margolis (1962), and Barrett (1965) characterizing 
EAA, with Isenberg (1950) being a special case, and Danto (1964), Goodman (1968), and 
Wollheim (1968) characterizing LAA. Upon investigation of these texts, the EAA-LAA shift 
poses a constitutive methodological shift, the PSI, from non-systematicity to systematicity, 
which must be accounted for if AA is to be considered a consistent programme.  
This inconsistency, it shall be argued, is merely apparent, and explainable as a swapping of 
priority between analytic and systematic methods from EAA to LAA.  
To help elucidate this, per Beaney, three modes of analysis -- regressive, resolutive, 
and transformative -- which admit of two classes -- reductive and paraphrastic -- 
characteristic of analytic philosophy were presented, with the AT being characterized by a 
synthesis of the paraphrastic-transformative and reductive-resolutive modes, with slight 
dominance of the former over the latter. Likewise, per Winfield, three models of system -- 
metaphysical, transcendental, and systematic -- characteristic of aesthetic philosophy were 
presented, with all three tending toward ‘systematicity in the ordinary sense’, which admits of 
two moments -- procedural (characterizing the systematic) and organizational (characterizing 
the metaphysical and transcendental). None of these interest us from a form-functional 
perspective, given that each contains a kernel around which the system fixates and to which 
its elements index, this being a mark of pre-AA.  
The modes of analysis and models of system presented here provide the tools by 
which we are to investigate the PSI throughout (1) EAA, (2) LAA, and (3) Cubism, which 
shall serve as a case-study to concretize the thesis and dynamic posed within this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Analysis, Synthesis and System in Cubism 
 
 
2.1 Cubism    
Du «Cubisme» (1912, 1947)1 by cubist painters Gleizes and Metzinger is the text which -- 
perhaps with cubist poet Apollinaire’s Les Peintres Cubistes, Méditations Esthétiques (1913) and 
cubist art dealer Kahnweiler’s Der Weg zum Kubismus (1915) -- is deemed the cubist manifesto. 
Here, the cubists admit to take inspiration from the realist Courbet and the post-
impressionist Cézanne who demonstrate through their respective oeuvres a genealogy, 
reprobative of idealist tendencies and approbative of realist ones:2 Courbet’s was an art of 
realism in that it ended the secular idealism of romanticism;3 impressionism was an art of optical 
realism and Cézanne’s post-impressionism was an art of perceptual realism; cubism was an art 
of conceptual realism.4 Thus, we observe a stepwise shift evermore into the subjective, yet only 
insofar as the subjective relates to the objective:  
 
“And this is, precisely, the revolutionary character of cubism,...«the most 
important pictorial revolution since the Renaissance.» [...] The Renaissance, the 
apotheosis of the SUBJECT, forces the predominance of the OBJECT... 
Categorically, cubism calls into question the rights of the object.”  
 
Here the cubists turn Moorean: though complexed subjectively, the constituents of thought 
are not defined as such, and thus the cubists, like Moore, maintain their realism through their 
adamancy of the objective existence of their concepts. The idealist outlook holds the content 
of thought to be so defined, as subjective and ideational; the realist outlook holds the 
content of thought to be not so defined, but as objective and non-ideational, that is, existent 
independently of thought and its complexing. It is of the latter that we ascribe the cubists.  
According to Fry in his introduction to Cubism (1966), a seminal anthology of select 
primary texts on the subject, cubism shared a fundamental revolutionary feature with the 
philosophical and scientific trends of the twentieth century: a deliberate break from the 
idealist outlook.5 In painting, if the monocularism of traditional techniques suggests the so-
called unitariness characteristic of idealism, then the binocularism (or rather multiocularism) 
of modernist techniques suggests the so-called plenitude characteristic of cubism.6 
Fundamentally, the cubist project was to depict the object, in painting, as it is in reality; i.e. viewed 
                                                          
1 Published in French in 1912 with an English translation in 1913; republished in French in 1947 with a critical 
preface by Gleizes and epilogue by Metzinger, untranslated. All are my own translations, with deference to 
Antliff & Leighten (2008) on the former.  
2 Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 38-41.  
3 Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 38. 
4 Fry (1966): 14.  
5 Fry (1966): 9.  
6 I borrow these terms from Hockney (2001): 189, who offers an alternative art-history based on the use or disuse 
of optics in painting; cf. footnote 62. 
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not from a single perspective but from a multiplicity of perspectives, simultaneously, given 
that real objects are themselves multi-perspectival. Metzinger’s Tea Time (1911) (Figure 17), is 
perhaps the purest example of this, given the dual-perspective with which the teacup is 
depicted: simultaneously viewed from the top and side, Metzinger depicts both (e.g.) its 
sloped body and elliptical rim because he knows, does not merely see, the real teacup to have 
both features. It is a more thorough, more real, depiction of the teacup as real object, impossible 
through single-perspective. The cubist outlook therefore marked a new pictorial language7 of 
non-imitative depiction by establishing a new self-sufficient relation between abstraction 
(form) and representation (content), requiring analytic and synthetic faculties by the artist 
and audience, to yield panoptically a depiction of the object as visual-cum-conceptual reality.  
It is these premises that derive the primary cubist aphorism: cubism as (conceptual) realism8 --  
or perhaps rather a nouveau réalisme.9 
Before proceeding, however, a brief enquiry into the major cubist methodologies is 
required. I shall iterate these as ‘technics’, properly so called, as they shall here be presented 
both as formal techniques and formalist studies of those techniques.  
 
2.1.1 Cubism: a History and Philosophy 
What follows is a chronology of the major technics characterizable of the cubist idiom in 
painting; they are here nine in number and admit of three general classes that anticipate the 
division of the cubist movement (CM) into two phases, including a transitional period:10 
 
1 Passage: the intersection of planes otherwise spatially separated as appearing both 
in-front-of and in-back-of adjoining planes.  
 
2 Faceting: the ‘cubification’ of figures as appearing lapidarian.  
 
Cézannean in origin, passage is rendered as repetitious uniform brushstrokes which flatten 
three-dimensional space and ambiguate the contours that delineate two-dimensional forms; 
in effect, it emphasizes the surface of the painting rather than the depth it depicts.11 Faceting 
is rendered as geometric angles and shapes which disambiguate surfaces and contours by 
monochromic light-shade contrasts like the facets of a cut gem; in effect, it emphasizes 
volume and the tangibility of space.12  
 
3 The notion of the tableau-objet or ‘picture object’. 
 
Paintings were now to be considered both depictive of reality and additional to that reality, 
                                                          
7 Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 74; (1947): 23; Golding (1959): xv; Fry (1966): 20; Cooper (1971): 107.  
8 Golding (1959): 17, 198; Fry (1966): 36; Cooper (1971): 264.  
9 Gleizes & Metzinger (1947): 79; Cooper (1971): 263.  
10 Cf. Figures 10-15.2 for exemplary works, generally per Cooper (1971): 45-59, 183-194. 
11 Cooper (1971): 18-19; Fry (1966): 14.  
12 Cooper (1971): 45. 
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related and yet coequal.13 This marked a key shift in the conceptualization of the ontological 
status of artworks and the role they were to play in adopting a realist attitude.  
 
4 Trompe l’oeil: the painting of illusorily-real figures as appearing existent.  
 
5 Lettering: the stenciling of text, often with associative relevance.  
 
Trompe-l’oeil is rendered in two paintings by Braque as (e.g.) a nail painted with regular 
shadow, upon which (in the first) the eponymous palette and (in the second) the painting 
itself appear to hang; in effect, here, it emphasizes the stylistic differences between traditional 
and cubistic means of representation.14 Lettering is rendered as stenciled text; in effect, being 
necessarily two-dimensional, it emphasizes planarity and, like reverse-repoussoir, differentiates 
between spatially-situated and spatially-non-situated figures.15 Braque’s 1909-10 nails and 
1911 lettering play similar ontological roles:16 emphasis of the schism between representation 
(qua picture) and reality (qua object) -- a technic generative from the notion of the painting as 
tableau-objet. 
 
6 The notion of signs. 
 
Paintings were now to be composed with a repertoire of abbreviated and identifiable features 
that facilitated the navigation of the composition in toto through a condensed sub-
composition; this extricated cubism from total abstraction and non-figurativism. Signs thus 
signified the first cubist attempts at “a comprehensive system of spatial notation”.17  
 
7 Collage: the introduction of facsimile readymades into an otherwise painted canvas. 
 
8 Papier collé or ‘pasted papers’: the introduction of paper collage. 
 
9 Impasto, etc.: the introduction of thickened paint, appearing textural or relief-like. 
 
Collage is rendered by Picasso as (e.g.) a textile print of, rather than actual, caning; in effect, it 
challenges the realness of ‘real-objects’ by giving them a false reality within ‘art-objects’.18 
This was the first type of sign proper. Papier collé is rendered as monochromic, printed, or 
textured paper, overlapped and drawn-upon; in effect, it emphasizes the cubistic  
                                                          
13 Cooper (1971): 183. 
14 Cooper (1971): 45. 
15 Cooper (1971): 54-56. 
16 This is, admittedly, a minimal description of their roles, though sufficient for the chronological device they are 
here purposed, as any further discussion shall lead this dissertation too far afield. Properly, such would note the 
ontological import of (e.g.): (1) artworks that partly seem to be real objects but are not (viz. trompe l’oeil); (2) 
artworks that partly seem to be real objects but are different real objects (viz. collage); (3) artworks that partly are 
the real objects they seem to be (viz. combines); (4) artworks that wholly are the real objects they seem to be (viz. 
readymades); and (5) artworks that wholly seem to be real objects but are not (viz. indiscernibles), or (6) artworks 
that seem to be other artworks, in whatever combination of (1)-(5), as either (a) a copy, (b) a forgery, or (c) a 
different artwork entirely. Cf. §4.1.1. 
17 Cooper (1971): 49-50. 
18 Cooper (1971): 58. 
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‘surface-realism’ incipient in passage.19 This was the second type of sign proper. Picasso’s 2012 
collage and papier collé play similar ontological roles, even to Braque’s nail and lettering: 
emphasis on the representation-reality schism -- a technic regenerative of the notion of the 
painting as tableau-objet.  
Throughout, we observe a general trend toward “real fragments of a non-pictorial 
world...play[ing] unreal roles in a pictorial world”,20 a diametrical contrast to traditional 
painting, where ‘unreal fragments of a pictorial world play real roles in a non-pictorial world’. 
Of course, the latter being the natural role of art in reality, cubism tended toward this as well. 
The cubist revolution was that it did each, in turn, through an analytic-synthetic 
methodological shift:21  
 
“Whereas previously Braque and Picasso had analyzed...the appearance of 
objects to discover a set of forms which would add up to...the formal elements 
of a composition, now they found that they could begin by composing with 
purely pictorial elements [...] and create their own pictorial reality by building up 
towards it through a synthesis of different elements.” 
 
Owing to the formalist reading of cubism’s development that traces through the reports of 
Kahnweiler (1915), Golding (1959), Fry (1966), and, in part, Cooper (1971),22 among Fry’s 
key contributions to both the art-history and the art-philosophy of cubism was his 
maintenance of cubism as biphasic, given a stylistic division into analytic and synthetic phases. 
This division generated out of the subject-object distinction:23 
 
1 Analytic cubism (AC) (1906-1912): A matter of the relation between the painter (as 
subject) and painted (as object). Of focus was the way in which the painter is able 
to render figures in accordance with cubistic technics; this entailed a process of 
analysis.  
 
2 Synthetic cubism (SC) (1912-1920s): A matter of the relations among the painted 
objects themselves, through the mediation of signs. Of focus was the way in which 
the audience is able to navigate the work and discern the figures rendered in it; this 
entailed a process of synthesis.  
 
AC is characterized by technics 1 and 2, though extends to 3 (tableau-objet) and its proximal 
manifestations, 4 and 5. Thus 1 and 2 constitute a first class, Class I. SC is characterized 
through technics 7, 8, and 9, these being proximal manifestations of 6 (signs), though perhaps 
distends to 3 (including 4 and 5), making them distal manifestations of 3, given that the sign 
was a consequence of the tableau-objet. Thus 6, 7, 8, and 9 constitute Class III. Owing to 
technic overlap, 3, 4, and 5 constitute Class II. I therefore offer an altered chronology of 
cubism: Class I (technics 1-2) and Class II (technics 3, 4-5) constitute the analytic phase, with 
II being a transitional period; Class III (technics 6, 7-9) constitutes the synthetic phase. 
                                                          
19 Cooper (1971): 183-185. 
20 Cooper (1971): 188. 
21 Cooper (1971): 188; formatted.  
22 Antliff & Leighten (2008): 2-3, 4-5.  
23 Fry (1966): 18, 24, 33.  
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The signs noted here are defined by Fry as “the formal qualities of an object... 
‘synthesized’ into a single characteristic, but highly conventionalized, new form.”24  
The impetus for this shift being the introduction of new media -- collage, papier collé -- into 
painting, Fry defines them both formally and functionally: papier collé was the first cubist tool 
for signifying objects by way of colour or texture rather than merely by way of line or plane. 
Absolutely flat yet capable of depicting the spatial relations of planes and volumes through 
overlapping, as well as the representational details of still life through over-drawing,  
papier collé individuated the functions of various pictorial elements (e.g. line and color), 
permitting line to define formal structure, and color to fulfill a dual-function of descriptive 
local color and formal monochromic shading.25 As such, per Fry, it was papier collé that 
defined the shift from AC to SC, thus characterizing the sign as the determiner of SC.  
In the following case-study, I shall argue this to be incorrect given Fry’s formalist-
functionalist definition of signs. Rather than characterize signs as unique to SC  
(viz. Class III), I shall show the role of the sign to be not only present but imperative in AC 
(viz. Class II), prior to the shift. This shall also argue the case for my altered chronology, 
emphasizing the import of Class II and thus the notion of the tableau-objet as precursory to 
that of the sign.  
 
2.1.2 Cubism: a Case-Study 
To reiterate, I introduce cubism here as a means to concretize my thesis and general 
approach in resolving the PSI. The idea is that, according to Fry’s stylistic division, the shift 
from analytic to synthetic cubism is like26 the shift from early to late anglophone aesthetics, 
such that AC implicitly entailed synthetic elements just as EAA implicitly entailed systematic 
elements, and that these elements were precisely those which prompted the shift to SC and 
LAA, respectively. My approach shall be to illustrate the presence of signs -- the determiner 
of SC -- in AC. In so doing, I shall show, visually, the sort of thing that I aim to explain, 
conceptually, throughout the remainder of this dissertation. This is what I mean by utilizing 
cubism as a case-study.  
To help accomplish this, I shall utilize a diagrammatic style that I shall call the Loran 
Diagramme (LD), after the art historian who developed the technique in his seminal analyses 
of Cézanne. Loran’s (1963) thesis was that Cézanne defined spatial relations in his paintings 
through the use of planes, lines, and contours, rather than through the use of colour 
modulation and gradation, as traditionally believed.27 According to Loran, Cézanne’s genius 
was most notably realized through his composition, the self-contained organization that his 
                                                          
24 Fry (1966): 33.  
25 Fry (1966): 33-34; Cooper (1971): 183, 194.  
26 One may take ‘like’ in three possible senses or strengths: as an isomorphism (in its strong sense), as an analogy  
(in its weak sense), or merely as a helpful heuristic (in its weaker sense); I maintain the weaker sense here. 
27 Loran (1963): 32; Wollheim (1994): 22. Cf. Loran’s ‘An Illustrated Glossary,’ parts 1 and 2 (pp 17-24), for 
explanations of these terms and those that follow. 
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planes and volumes provide and the ‘return out of depth’ that results from their movement.28 
This return is the specific sort of relation mastered by Cézanne and transformed by the 
cubists; it consists of, firstly, movement into depth by the overlapping of objective planes, 
and, secondly, movement out of depth by their merging with subjective planes.29 The effect is, 
as Loran notes, “the modern rebirth of the classical ideal of pictorial space, which is  
three-dimensionality conceived in relation to the two-dimensionality of the picture plane.”30  
His Illustrated Glossary, in combination with his Introductory Analysis of Cézanne’s 
Still Life with Faience Jug (Figure 1), are crucial sources for understanding Loran’s technique. 
Diagrammes from the latter, but not the former, are reprinted here in Appendix 1 as Figures 
1.1 to 1.9, though my focus will be almost exclusively on Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3  
(per Loran (1963), DIAGRAMS I, II, V): the depiction of outlines, planes, and carry-through 
lines, and their contribution to the return out of depth that is so crucial to a formalist 
understanding of cubism. Before proceeding, however, I turn momentarily to a note on 
formalism and some of its possible distinctions, in order to hone my project. In so doing,  
I shall defend Loran’s diagrammatic technique from Wollheim’s critique and objection.  
 
A note on Formalism. Formalism31 is the general thesis that the defining elements of an 
artwork are its plastic or formal elements: e.g. line, colour,32 mass, space, light-shade, plane,33 
volume, tension, shape, gradation, vector,34 texture, configuration, etc. These are often 
distinguished from the subject-matter or content of the work.35 The modern formalist paradigm 
is perhaps the Bell-Fry thesis, a portmanteau of the aesthetics offered by Bell in Art (1914)36 
and Fry in An Essay in Aesthetics (1909, 1920)37 which holds the criterial (essentialist, 
definitional) element in art to be ‘significant form’ and the ‘aesthetic emotions’ that it 
prompts. Although the onus on emotion here makes this thesis something of a ‘formalist-
expressionist’ aesthetics rather than ‘formalist’ simpliciter, the onus on form (viz. Fry’s ‘elements 
of design’) makes it anticipatory of those like Wollheim’s physical-object hypothesis:38 that works of 
art are physical objects rather than non-physical esoteries, as in aesthetic-object theory.39  
It is this hypothesis that is at work throughout Wollheim’s analysis of formalism.  
                                                          
28 Loran (1963): 20.  
29 Cf. Loran (1963): 103; reprinted below in §2.1.2.2.  
30 Loran (1963): 32; formatted.  
31 This note on formalism proceeds with an intentional omission of other types of aesthetic theory -- most 
notably perhaps being variants of expressionism; this must be assumed outright, as a proper defense of 
formalism against these would take this dissertation too far afield. In the first instance, cf. Bouwsma (1950) and 
Ryle (1951) in Elton (1954), Tomas (1952) in Margolis (1962), and Hepburn (1961) in Barrett (1965).  
32 Bell (1914): 17.  
33 Fry (1909, 1920): 22. 
34 Loran (1963): 40-43. 
35 Isenberg, however, rejects this as a logically inconsistent vestige of the Fechnerian distinction between the 
Formaesthetiker and Inhaltsaesthetiker, rather distinguishing subject-matter as a subclass of form, admitting of 
degrees (1944: 562, 1955: 25; Mothersill (1973): xxxiii; Guyer (2014): 382, 383-384, 386).  
36 On Bell, cf. Guyer (2014): 115-123.  
37 On Fry, cf. Guyer (2014): 123-128.  
38 Wollheim (1968): 4; (1980a): 177.  
39 Wollheim (1980a): 177-178.  
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In On Formalism and Its Kinds (1994), Wollheim provides a cross-classification of the 
formalist thesis by making two broad and independent distinctions within it, thereby yielding 
four kinds of formalism. The first distinction is between:40 
1 Normative or Prescriptive Formalism: a theory of how works ought to be; that the 
composition of a work (e.g. painting) ought to be a certain way, and is both 
necessary and sufficient for evaluating the work.  
 
2 Analytic or Descriptive Formalism: a theory of how works are; that the composition 
of a work (e.g. painting) necessarily is a certain way, and is both necessary and 
sufficient for understanding the work.  
 
And the second distinction is between:41  
 
3 Manifest Formalism: the forms fundamental to a work (e.g. painting) are observable 
across its surface; in principle, they are isolable and diagrammable through some 
surrogate means of depiction. 
 
4 Latent Formalism: the forms fundamental to a work (e.g. painting) are 
unobservable across its surface; in principle, they are not diagrammable but 
formulable only abstractly.  
 
This latter distinction is further emphasized by the analytic methods most appropriately 
befitting each, with manifest formalism favoring geometrical, and latent formalism favoring 
grammatical, methods.42 Yet, because “form is basically a perceptual, not a lexical or 
linguistic, concept,” Wollheim claims that the former, and not the latter, is the proper 
approach for the formalist.43 Nevertheless, this methodological distinction echoes an earlier 
distinction made by Wollheim in determining the analytic methods open to the 
analytic/descriptive formalist in her project of providing an adequate description of an 
artwork. The distinction is between:44   
 
1 The lexical method: appeal to the language that the critic uses in description. 
 
2 The operational method: appeal to some operation that the critic could, at least 
imaginatively, administer directly to the work. 
 
Yet, these methods are not equally appropriate. Whereas the latter will successfully 
accomplish the two-part task of (1) articulating what form is by (2) disentangling the formal 
and non-formal features of a work, the former will slunk either into circularity -- when the 
critical vocabulary is itself formal -- or arbitrariness -- when the critical vocabulary is anything 
else.45 According to Wollheim, then, despite the admitted “under-development” of the 
manifest-latent distinction, the formalistic approach with which he is currently concerned is 
                                                          
40 Wollheim (1994): 8. Per Wollheim, Isenberg’s unpublished lecture manuscript titled Formalism (1955) is an 
implicit critique of normative formalism and his Perception, Meaning, and the Subject Matter of Art (1944) is an 
implicit critique of analytic formalism. Per Mothersill (1973), the former is a good introduction to the latter.  
41 Wollheim (1994): 14.  
42 Wollheim (1994): 14.  
43 Wollheim (1994): 13; 26, 30. 
44 Wollheim (1994): 12. 
45 Wollheim (1994): 12-13.  
 
42 
 
an analytic, manifest formalism, and operational methodology.  
In the following subsections, I shall undertake a case-study of cubism from an 
analytic-manifest standpoint, by way of the operational method. I am therefore so far in 
agreement with Wollheim’s formalism. The method that I shall adopt and adapt -- the 
diagrammatic method developed by Loran -- is a version of one of two operations explored 
by Wollheim as applicable to an analytic-manifest approach. The two operations are:46 
 
1 The ‘extractive’ (two-dim.) operation: trace, perpendicular to the line-of-vision, what 
is visible on the picture through a sheet of glass; the work’s form is then 
identifiable with this traced depiction.  
 
2 The ‘projective’ (three-dim.) operation: construct, according to some rule, what is 
visible in the picture -- first a ground-plan and second representational figurines; 
the work’s form is then identifiable with this constructed model.  
 
Yet, again, these methods are not equally appropriate. Whereas the latter integrates seeing-in47 
within the analytic operation, the former remains susceptible to a Janus-faced practical 
problem: (1) how the extraction is to be done, and (2) what instruction is to be followed for 
its doing. Wollheim offers two rules as a preliminary attempt to answer these problems:48 
 
1 The ‘inclusive’ rule: “Trace all the lines visible through the glass.” 
 
2 The ‘exclusive’ rule: “Trace only the lines visible through the glass.” 
 
Yet both of these instructions are problematic. The former is supersufficient, as it requires 
even the tracing of lines that do not constitute forms (e.g., thorns); the latter is insufficient, 
as it requires the tracing of untraceable forms (e.g., clouds).49 This leads to Wollheim’s 
objection to the extractive operation, namely: “that there is an inconsistency between what 
recommends the operation to us in the first instance and what can be expected from it when 
put into practice.”50 This inconsistency is, according to Wollheim, an effect of the implicit 
assumption operating within the extractive operation, namely: “the belief that the form of a 
painting is something inherently two-dimensional.”51 He remedies this, as noted above,  
by appealing to our proclivities for ‘seeing’ the three-dimensional in the two-dimensional:52  
 
“[I]t is a feature of our perceptual apparatus that, whenever we look at a 
surface marked to any degree of complexity, we shall, while continuing 
to observe the marks on the surface, at the same time see one thing in 
front of, or behind, another...I call this perceptual capacity ‘seeing-in’...” 
 
The crucial and subversive point here is that, per Wollheim, the identification of the form of 
                                                          
46 Wollheim (1994): 15-16, 19-20.  
47 Cf. §4.1.3.  
48 Wollheim (1994): 16.  
49 Wollheim (1994): 16. The example referred to here is Breughel (1564): Christ Carrying the Cross to Calvary.  
50 Wollheim (1994): 17.  
51 Wollheim (1994): 17.  
52 Wollheim (1994): 17-18.  
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an artwork requires reference to the representational content of that work; what is more, it 
requires not merely reference to what is represented, but to how it is represented.53  
Given this importance attributed to representational content and three-dimensionality 
by Wollheim for the analysis of pictorial form, I conclude this ‘note on formalism’ with a 
brief defense against Wollheim. Recall that he is here occupied with, and in some respects 
endorsive of: analytic/descriptive (not normative/prescriptive) formalism, manifest  
(not latent) formalism, the operational (not lexical) method, and the projective  
(not extractive) operation. It is against the lattermost point that I shall defend.  
Wollheim concludes the extractive operation to be insufficient for its purposes, and uses 
Loran to do so:54  
 
“[T]hough, through the use of diagrams, he can analyze, on the one hand, 
[1] how the artist organizes the picture-plane and, on the other hand, [2] 
how he organizes the represented space, what, in the nature of things, 
Loran cannot present diagrammatically is [3] the meeting-point of the two, 
which is, for him, precisely where...pictorial achievement in general, lies. 
The reason is this: that any diagram that Loran might construct can, at any 
one moment, function either as [1] a depiction of the two-dimensional 
picture-plane or as [2] a depiction of the three-dimensional scene 
represented on the picture-plane. What it cannot do is [3] to function 
simultaneously as both.” 
 
For Wollheim, the navigation of Loran’s text, indeed the navigation of his diagrammes 
themselves, requires a return “back to the painting itself” to “experience the fusion” between 
(1) the two-dimensional picture-plane and (2) the three-dimensional pictorial space.55  
I take no issue with this. Loran makes no claim that his diagrammes are to be taken in 
isolation; in fact, he not only accompanies his diagrammes with copies of their paintings,  
but with photographs of the motifs after which the paintings were modeled.56 Wollheim’s 
claim to the insufficiency of diagrammes without their originals, then, seems not to apply to 
Loran. Yet, the Janus-faced practical problem remains. Wollheim thwarted this by rejecting 
the extractive operation in favor of the projective; however, since such a move is 
inconsistent with Loran’s project, I shall object. To solve this, I offer a third rule:  
 
3 The ‘selective’ rule: Trace some of the lines visible through the glass; justify the 
selection with an accompanying narrative, etc. 
 
This instruction requires neither the tracing of untraceable forms (per rule 2), nor the tracing 
of non-forms (per rule 1); what it does require is an explanation to accompany the 
diagramme and original work (and motif photograph, if possible). The explanatory narrative 
provided justifies the selection of lines traced and forms extracted from the picture-plane.  
This permits the formalist to trace (1) all the lines, and (2) only the lines, visible through the 
                                                          
53 Wollheim (1994): 18-19, 20.  
54 Wollheim (1994): 25.  
55 Wollheim (1994): 25.  
56 E.g. Loran (1963): Plate XVI, Maison Maria at Château Noir. 
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glass, that are form-contributive (3) for the purposes of the diagramme presently undertaken. 
She may then trace different form-contributive lines indexed to a different diagramme which 
depicts different elements of the original’s overall form; collectivized, the diagrammes then 
constitute a diagrammatic set.57 The narratives link those elements of each particular 
diagramme with those elements of its original, resulting in an analytic/descriptive formalist 
triad: (1) the original, (2) its set of diagrammes, and (3) their narratives. Given the many ways 
by which a work may be diagrammed (viz. Figs.1.1-1.9), it is not one, as Wollheim presumes, 
but a set of diagrammes that may adequately describe the form of a work. This is, in fact, 
what Loran provides and is also consistent with Wollheim’s anticipation for the operational 
method:58  
 
Applied to an individual painting, it will, for each turn...separate off its 
formal from its non-formal features. And, as it does this, diagramme by 
diagramme, it will, over time, and in an intuitively plausible fashion, 
come to articulate what that painting’s form is. 
 
Yet note the import of ‘adequacy’ here. Procedurally, I borrow from Richards and Ogden 
(1925) their practical attitude toward the sixteen types of aesthetic theory that derive their 
attempted general synthesis of aesthetics: namely that “there are plainly different parts of the 
situation on which emphasis can be laid” and that “we may begin where we please” so long 
as where we begin and what we emphasize betters our understanding of the overall 
‘situation’.59 An adequate description of the form of the work, then, shall be one which betters 
the work’s understandability (or, as I shall call it, navigability) to some degree. 
The set of diagrammes and narratives therefore operate according to a principle of 
asymptotic approximation toward an exhaustive depiction of the form of the work. This, per 
Wollheim, maintains the import of the original artwork and yet, contra Wollheim, rescues the 
extractive operation (and Loran’s project) from outright rejection; thus, one need not reject, 
as Wollheim does, the extractive operation and with it Loran’s project. I shall therefore, in 
the following sections, adopt and adapt Loran’s diagrammatic method by providing, for each 
noted artwork, a triad of original, set of diagrammes, and set of narratives, and shall do so 
from an analytic-manifest, operational, extractive, selective formalist standpoint.60 
                                                          
57 E.g. Loran (1963): Plates X, XXII-XXVI, XXXVII, Sainte Victoire (various).  
58 Adapted from Wollheim (1994): 12-13. I have here shifted Wollheim’s original statement from the general to 
the particular. The quotation concerns form in general, and takes as its focus the articulation of what form is, 
across paintings; this paraphrase instead concerns form in a particular work, and takes as its focus the articulation 
of what a painting’s form is, across diagrammes. What permits this shift is precisely the admission of more than 
one diagramme within the set that articulates a work’s form; Wollheim’s quotation implicitly assumes one 
diagramme per painting, whereas the paraphrase explicitly does not. I find that such a process of 
particularization better befits the aims of AA -- viz. Lamarque’s second proviso (Cf. Hampshire (1952)). 
59 Richards & Ogden (1925): 18-19, 20-21; cf. Figure  
60 The merits of this standpoint, and a general defense of diagramation arguments (in painting) such as that 
presented here, can perhaps be best demonstrated through a particular genealogy of empirical enquiry into the 
compositional methods of the Baroque and Dutch Golden Age painter, Vermeer. This concerns the long-
standing hypothesis that Vermeer, in composing his twenty-three domestic interiors, utilized optics --  
i.e. (convex) lens, camera obscura or camera lucida, (concave) mirror-lens, and (angled) ‘comparator mirror’; of particular 
focus is Vermeer’s The Music Lesson (1662-1665) (Figure 9.1).  
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Analytic Cubism. Analytic cubism began with Picasso’s The Maidens of Avignon (1906-07) 
(Figure 16), abandoned in 1907. Despite it being more properly characterized as  
proto-cubist,61 this painting presents three characteristics that are fundamentally cubist:  
(1) multi-point perspective, evident especially in the lower-right figure, (2) primitivism 
reminiscent of so-called ‘art nègre’, evident stylistically in the three left figures and literally in 
the right two figures, and (3) non-imitative representation.62 The revolution in this painting, 
then, was Picasso’s break from two key characteristics of traditional occidental painting:  
the classical human figure and one-point linear-perspective.63 I shall focus on the latter.  
Since its discovery during Renaissance painting, the portrayal of depth within pictorial 
space was accomplished through the use of one-point linear-perspective and a vanishing-
point. The paradigmatic example of this is Da Vinci’s The Last Supper (1494-9) (Figure 2.1). 
From its accompanying Loran Diagramme (Figure 2.2) it is evident that the converging lines 
formed by elements in the environment contribute to a feeling of depth behind the seated 
figures; what makes this painting so powerful is that the vanishing-point, that toward which 
the lines converge, is positioned directly on Jesus’ face, marked with an X. Since Jesus’ body-
plane is positioned in front of (i.e., overlapping) the body-planes of his adjacent diners,  
as indicated by the small arrows which point into depth, the combination of X as both proceeding 
toward and receding away from the picture-plane generates a return out of depth, at X,  
as indicated by the arrows marked I and II. This technique relies upon the environmental 
elements to establish depth and return out of it. Compare this to the Caravaggio (Figure 3). 
Instead of environmental elements, this tenebrist portrait utilizes exaggerated chiaroscuro, the 
‘light-dark’ spotlight effect, to bring the figure out of pictorial space and toward the picture-
plane. A similar effect is achieved by the Courbet (Figure 4), though through different 
means. In this realist portrait, the figure is brought out of depth by way of similarity in 
painterly style between the background and foregrounded figure; this generates a feeling of 
compression within the paining, a lessening-of-depth between the picture-plane and the back 
                                                                                                                                                               
Swillens (1965), Steadman (2001), Hockney (2001), and Jenison (2013) demonstrate a genealogical development 
of Wollheim’s projective operation and, in so doing, explicate a potential rule (or set of rules) by which the 
operation may be executed (cf. Appendix, Figures 20, 21.1-21.2). Swillens and Steadman employ reverse-
geometrical perspective analysis of the paintings’ pictorial spaces to generate diagrammes in plan-, side-, and 
axonometric- views; Hockney employs analysis of lens-prompted distortive artefacts on the paintings’ picture-
planes or surfaces; Steadman and Jenison construct doll- and life- sized models of the painting, which Jenison 
then uses to recreate it (Figure 9.2). Wollheim’s present construal of the extractive and projective operations 
dictate that the former (viz. Loran) is confined to the frame of the picture-plane of the original’s viewpoint, 
whereas the latter (viz. Swillens-Steadman) is not, admitting of other views; as such, it may be said that the 
diagrammes suffice for at least a minimal projective operation, as they are not generated solely through means of 
extractive tracing, and that the models suffice for a maximal projective operation. Whether a three-dimensional 
model requires a two-dimensional diagramme as its blueprint, and whether any projection must entail some 
emergent information -- adequate to better understandability -- not entailed by the blueprint in order to avoid 
redundancy or reducibility to the diagramme, requires further enquiry. Perhaps what Wollheim requires, rather 
than his operational distinction, is the following caveat: that the extractive method need not be confined merely 
to the frame of the picture-plane of the viewpoint of the original painting.  
61 Cooper (1971): 24. 
62 Penrose (1974): 125.  
63 Fry (1966): 13.  
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wall which, in turn, lessens the depth of the figure as well.  
I shall call this ‘two-dimensionalization’ or ‘two-dimensionalizing’ pictorial space.  
It is this effect that is accomplished by, as per above, passage and papier collé, cubist technics  
1 and 8. 
The Ambroise Vollard Portraiture series illustrates this further. Compared to Régis 
Courbet, and, yet, to Saint Jerome, Vollard is two-dimensionalized between the picture-plane 
and background even moreso in the impressionist portrait by Renoir (Figure 5.3),  
and moreso still in the post-impressionist portrait by Cézanne (Figure 5.4). Compare these to 
his seated photograph (Figure 5.1) and Picasso’s neoclassicist sketch from it (Figure 5.2)  
in the style of Ingres. As evident in the accompanying Loran Diagramme (Figure 5.5) 
Vollard’s dynamic body-plane makes a return out of depth, away from planes A and C, as 
indicated by the arrows marked I and II. This, in combination with Cézanne’s colour 
modulation and distortion (viz. the off-set from M to N), two-dimensionalizes the pictorial 
space, bringing the entire scene up to the picture-plane. The Loranian dynamic of ‘returning 
out of depth’, reaches new exaggeration, however, in the cubist portrait of Vollard by Picasso 
(1909) (Figure 5.6). Its accompanying Loran Diagramme (Figure 5.7) indicates movement 
into depth on both sides of the face, on his right to plane C, which forms part of the bottle 
sitting in the background, as well as on his left; however these overlapping objective planes 
are ‘brought back’ to the level of the face-plane by merging with the large subjective plane 
marked A. A similar, though more exaggerated composition (Figure 6.3) is evident in 
Picasso’s subsequent portrait of Uhde (early 1910) (Figure 6.2); compare with the 
photograph (Figure 6.1). And a similar, though more exaggerated composition, still  
(Figure 7.3) is evident in his subsequent portrait of Kahnweiler (late 1910) (Figure 7.2); 
compare with the photograph (Figure 7.1). Loran’s narrative for this portrait is iterated 
below:64 
 
“Starting with the plane of the left cheek bone, marked with a large numeral 1, 
a series of planes marked, 2, 3, and 4 overlap and move into depth. Plane 4, 
however, is ‘brought back’ to the level of plane 1 by being merged with the 
large ‘subjective’ plane defined by broken lines and the double-pointed axis bars 
marked A. The planes on the right side of the head, quite to the contrary, 
combine in such a way as to build up a solid-volume structure that is 
inconsistent with the rest of the painting. Starting with the nose, the planes 
move downward and to the right, as indicated by arrows in the diagram, 
constructing objectively recognizable planes for nose, cheek, and jaw. The 
movement continues downward and into the deeper layer of the plane, marked 
B, with vertical and horizontal axis bars. The volume of the head remains solid 
on the right and the planes of the nose and cheek are not fused with plane B as 
they are with plane A on the left side of the head. Part of the head thus comes 
out as a recognizable volume. In fact, it separates rather disturbingly from the 
rest of the space, and it may be said that the two-dimensionality of the picture 
plane is not nearly so well maintained...” 
 
                                                          
64 Loran (1963): 103.  
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This lattermost work is what Loran uses to exemplify his diagrammatic technique, as applied 
to AC. 
 
Synthetic Cubism. Synthetic cubism reached its apogee with Picasso’s Three Musicians 
(1921), of which there are two versions, the later shown here (Figure 18). The revolution in 
this painting was Picasso’s mimicry of papier collé not with paper, but with planes of colour. 
The bodies of the three figures -- stock characters of the Commedia dell’arte: Harlequin, 
Pierrot, and Monk -- are composed of planar passages that require tracing throughout the 
composition, not according to line, but according to colour (e.g. the white planes of the 
Pierrot); each is thereby depicted by means of conventionalized and condensed, that is, 
‘synthesized’ signs in their purest form.65  The papier collé wineglass in Picasso’s Still-life with 
Violin and Fruit (1912) (Figure 15.2), however, better illustrates Fry’s definition of a sign as 
‘synthesized’. Like Metzinger’s teacup, (Figure 17) it is viewed simultaneously from the top 
and side, but unlike Metzinger’s teacup, depicts other more telling features, like (e.g.)  
the refractive properties of the glass by diagonally offsetting the newsprint. This, in relation 
to the violin and fruit-bowl, being signs themselves, aids in representing a tablescape where 
there isn’t one depicted, but only hinted at by woodgrain papier collé. The still-life, as still-life, 
thereby becomes more navigable once the sign’s double-purpose is fulfilled: first, the formal 
elements of each sign are synthesized, and second, the relations amongst signs are 
synthesized, to yield, third, the artwork as a system.  
 
2.1.3 Conclusion to ‘Cubism: a Case-Study’ 
The general trend throughout Figures 2.1, 3, 4, 5.3, 5.4, 5.6, 6.2, 7.2, (and 8) -- though 
specifically the Picasso portraits, 5.6, 6.2, 7.2, (and 8) -- epitomizes the increasing 
exaggeration of the ‘return out of depth’ or ‘two-dimensionalization’ that AC brings to its 
extreme in its later works. Evidently, the two-dimensionalization of a three-dimensional 
figure, as rendered by the cubists, decreases in its comprehension as it increases in its 
thoroughness. The shift from Figure 5.6 to Figure 6.2, from Figure 6.2 to Figure 7.2, and 
from Figure 7.2 to Figure 8 illustrates this. It also illustrates something about the way by 
which we navigate works of high two-dimensionalized thoroughness. In navigating such 
works, we descry discrete, condensed, and informationally-rich elements by which we 
orientate ourselves through the artwork. This functions as a bipartite process:  
 
1 Local synthesis: first, local formal elements are synthesized, per sign, to yield a set-
of-signs.  
 
2 Global synthesis: second, global formal elements are synthesized amongst signs as 
they interrelate, to yield the artwork in toto.  
 
                                                          
65 Fry (1966): 34.  
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Picasso’s Man with a Violin (1912) (Figure 8), recommended by Fry as apogeal of AC,66 
perhaps illustrates this process even better than his portrait of Kahnweiler (Figure 7.2), 
recommended by Loran. Note the f-holes present at the bottom of Figure 8; identifiable as 
the f-holes to a violin, they, perhaps in conjunction with the c-shaped scroll and s-curved 
waist of the violin (local formal elements), facilitate the navigation of the work by virtue of 
the relations among them and other signs throughout (global formal elements),  
e.g. the ear-shape and nose-shape, hinted at by the title.67 These are, in effect, the signs  
-- or perhaps proto-signs -- that Fry notes as determining the shift from AC to SC. Given that 
Fry defines the sign form-functionally, and given that these (proto-)signs fulfill both Fry’s 
formal and functional definitions, I conclude that these elements are, too, signs in their own 
right, on account of the formal role they play in the composition of the artwork and its 
navigability. The sign, technic 6, can therefore be deemed a fundamental form-functional 
compositional element throughout both phases of cubism. Thus, the shift in phase, from AC 
to SC, is not to be attributed solely to the presence of the sign, as determiner of SC;  
rather, this shift entailed a swapping of the priority of the sign between phases as a key 
compositional element. 
 
2.1.4 Statement of the Unitary-Plenary Distinction in Cubism 
The mythic etymology of the term ‘cubism’ derives from an alleged description made by the 
fauvist Matisse to critic Vauxcelles, that the early-cubist landscapes of l’Estaque appeared as 
having been painted ‘avec des petits cubes’, and in an attempt to canonize these ‘bizarreries 
cubiques’, to the Cézannean fundamentals of the cone, cylinder, and sphere, was added the cube.68 
Much like the term ‘impressionism’, ‘cubism’ originated as a pejorative requiring correction, 
such as that stated in the opening lines of Du Cubisme, for the cubist project extended well 
beyond the mere act of ‘cubification’:69 
 
“The word cubism is used here only to [indicate]...the object of this study, 
[though]...the idea it evokes, that of volume, could not in and of itself define a 
movement tending toward the integral realization of painting.” 
 
“To compose, to construct, to draw, can be reduced to this: to regulate... 
the dynamism of form. Some...locate the ends of our technique exclusively in the 
study of volumes. If they added that, surfaces being the boundaries of volumes 
and lines being the boundaries of surfaces, to imitate a contour suffices to 
represent a volume, we might agree with them, but they are thinking only of the 
‘sensation of relief’, which we judge insufficient. We are not geometers...for us, 
lines, surfaces, and volumes are nuances of the notion of plenitude.”  
 
 
                                                          
66 Fry (1966): 24.  
67 Kahnweiler (1915): 13.  
68 Kahnweiler (1915): 5-6; Apollinaire (1913): 16; Golding (1959): 3-5; Fry (1966): 17; Cooper (1971): 37; cf. esp. 
Fry (1966): 51. 
69 Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 37, 51-52; formatted.  
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As such, Gleizes and Metzinger (1912) name composition as fundamental to painting, and 
outline two general compositional methods for their art:70 
 
“[T]here are two ways to understand the division [of the canvas]. [1] According 
to the first, all the parts are linked by a[n]...artifice determined by one of them. 
The latter part -- whichever point it occupies on the canvas -- gives the painting 
a center [...]. [2] According to the second, in order for the spectator...to be able 
to apprehend all elements...the properties of each part must be left independent, 
and the plastic continuum shattered into a thousand surprises...Thus the two 
methods appear antithetical.” 
 
It is here that we find the inception of a key distinction I shall apply to AA throughout the 
remainder of this dissertation. It is a distinction between two senses of ‘system’ or 
‘systematicity’ as applied to artworks -- where an artwork is to be considered a system insofar 
as it is compositionally complex, i.e. has two or more compositional or sub-compositional elements (e.g. signs) 
related through some determinable relation, and where systematicity is, quite plainly, the quality of being a 
system or systematic; this is a minimal sense of system. It is the distinction between systematicity 
defined by a central element (per method 1), and systematicity defined by a continuum of 
independent elements (per method 2), hence, systematicities whereof system is established, 
in the former, by a unit, and, in the later, by a plenitude. The systematic distinction is therefore: 
 
1 Unitary systematicity: some single element is maintained as the system kernel; the 
system is defined in terms of how its parts relate to this element, with it necessarily 
privileged. This is the systematicity of idealism.  
 
2 Plenary systematicity: no single element is maintained as the system kernel; rather, 
the system is defined in terms of how its parts relate mutually, like a network, with 
no part necessarily privileged. This is the systematicity of realism (qua cubism).  
 
The difference in compositional perspective noted at the start of this chapter corresponds: 
the monocular perspective characteristic of traditional techniques illustrates the unitary 
systematicity characteristic of idealist aesthetics; whereas the multiocular perspectives 
characteristic of cubist techniques illustrates the plenary systematicity characteristic of realist 
aesthetics, such as in cubism. In the former, the composition is defined in terms of how its 
parts relate to the single vanishing point, necessarily privileged as that which depicts (e.g.) 
depth within pictorial space; in the latter, the composition is defined in terms of how its 
parts, rendered as signs, interrelate to one another, with no part privileged as that which 
depicts (e.g.) depth, given that depth and return out of depth, is an effect of passage,  
the interplay of objective and subjective planes (Figures 5.7, 6.3, and 7.3), and thus the 
relations which hold among mutually independent sub-compositional parts and the 
composition as a whole. What remains is a brief comment as to the nature of these relations.  
I take my cue from Moore (1903b), who outlines four types of relation -- three failing 
and one succeeding -- to properly characterize the relationship between parts-and-wholes in 
                                                          
70 Gleizes & Metzinger (1912): 59-60.  
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an organic unity. These are what I shall call:71 
 
1 The reciprocity relation: part-part causal dependence; parts are mutually means and 
ends to one another. 
 
2 The purposivity relation: part-whole causal dependence; parts are means to the 
whole, which is an end. 
 
3 The analyticality relation: part-whole/whole-part predication; parts are defined as 
predicated of the whole (i.e. part x ‘is a part of whole y’); the whole is part of the 
predicate used to predicate the part as part of the whole. 
 
4 The com-valuation relation: part-whole valuation difference; “a whole has an intrinsic 
value different in amount from the sum of the values of its parts.” 
 
This lattermost relation is Moore’s principle of organic unities; of the above, the relations at 
play in systematizing cubist artworks, as described, are perhaps nearest to this relation. Recall 
that the process of navigating a cubist artwork entails, first, a step of local synthesis, and 
second, a step of global synthesis. Neither does the local synthesis of any sign influence the 
local synthesis of any other, contra relation 1; nor do the local syntheses of any set of signs 
necessitate only the global synthesis of the artwork, contra relation 2; nor is any sign defined 
as predicated of the artwork, contra relation 3; for signs are mutually independent rather than 
means-and-ends of one another, means-to-an-end other than themselves, or limited only to 
their significance within the artwork. Rather, it is merely maintained, per relation 4, that the 
navigability of an artwork, as a whole, becomes ‘different in amount’ -- that is, bettered --  
on account of the summation or interrelation of its sub-compositional parts.  
The relations at play in systematizing cubist artworks are not the relation of Moore’s 
organic unity, however. This is because relation 4 is valuational, with ‘good’ being the 
predicate of value. Given that the beautiful and the aesthetic are themselves first- and 
second- order organic unities,72 Moorean aesthetics itself, an ethico-aesthetics, becomes 
indexed to ‘good’. This situates Moorean aesthetics quite nearer to Crocean aesthetics than it 
might prima facie seem: per Croce, the parts of ‘unity in variety’ are defined by their relation to 
beauty; likewise, per Moore, the parts of ‘organic unity’ are defined by their relation to goodness. 
Although devised in bidirectional means -- which is to say that Croce builds-to beauty, 
whereas Moore builds-from goodness -- given that both the Crocean ‘beautiful’ and 
Moorean ‘good’ are unanalyzable par excellence, they constitute the privileged kernels around 
which their respective systems fixate, thereby categorizing both Croce and Moore as  
unitarily-systematic, rather than plenarily-systematic. (The same may be said of Winfield’s three 
types of aesthetic theory, wherein the privileged givens (type 1) or determiners (type 2), or 
primitive minimal term (type 3), likewise constitute each system’s kernel.) In this respect, 
Moore retains a vestige of traditional aesthetics, and thus, despite being a great analyst of the 
                                                          
71 Moore (1903b): 32, 32, 33, 36 (resp.); I derive the names from the terms Moore uses to describe them.  
72 Cf. §1.1.2. 
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tradition, is excluded here from among the AA. We might therefore opt to remove this 
valuational element altogether, and adapt the Moorean formulation of relation 4 to yield a 
generalized version:  
 
4′ The Gestaltist relation: mere part-whole difference; the whole is (merely) other than 
the sum of its parts.  
 
Surely, if one opted to formulate this in terms of a sort of magnitude, as Moore does, and 
talk of difference in amount rather than (e.g.) type, then one may, and in the above I do. 
Such an adaptation serves to shift the part-whole relation at play here away from the idealist 
(or quasi-idealist) unitary systematicity and toward the realist (or cubist) plenary systematicity, 
for this, I submit, is the general nature of the relations at play in cubism, as well as in AA.   
Precisely how these distinctions -- ‘monocular-multiocular’, ‘idealist-realist’, and 
‘unitary-plenary’ -- apply to AA throughout its shift from EAA to LAA is the topic of 
following chapters.  
 
2.2 Conclusion to Chapter 2  
To reiterate again, I introduce cubism here as a means to concretize my thesis and general 
approach in resolving the PSI in AA. In so doing, the usefulness of cubism as a case-study 
has proven to be twofold.  
Firstly, it has aided my parallel between the shifts internal to CM and AA. The 
argument goes as follows: The shift from AC to SC is like the shift from EAA to LAA, such 
that: (1) both CM and AA entailed some element -- for the former, the notion of the sign; for 
the latter, the notion of systematicity (in general) -- that, (2) despite presumed as the determiner 
of each shift -- absent in each earlier phase and present in each later phase -- is in fact present 
throughout, and that (3) the shifts were rather a swapping of the priority of this element -- from 
secondary in each earlier phase to primary in each later phase, and thus present implicitly in each 
earlier phase and explicitly in each later phase. Thus, as applied to CM, both the analytic and 
synthetic phases of cubism entailed signs, as form-functionally defined by Fry; yet whereas 
AC positioned other technics (1-5) as primary and the sign (technic 6) as secondary -- that is, 
as a merely compositional tool for navigating the artwork despite the other technics -- SC 
positioned the sign (qua technics 7-9) as primary and the other technics (1-5) as secondary,  
if at all. The shift in phase was therefore merely a swapping of priority of the sign. 
Secondly, it has introduced a key distinction between two senses of systematicity -- 
unitary and plenary -- that I shall use in elucidating points 2 and 3 above regarding the EAA-
LAA shift. That is, per the specific version of the thesis: that (1) the call to non-systematicity 
in EAA was rather (2) a call for a new systematicity (3) which emerged as explicit in LAA, 
though implicit in EAA. The new systematicity was the cubist notion of systematicity,  
i.e. a realist plenary-systematicity, as opposed to the idealist unitary-systematicity.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Early Anglophone Aesthetics 
 
 
3.1 Introduction to Early Anglophone Aesthetics1 
This chapter, like the one after, is a survey of the aesthetic philosophies of EAA figures, 
particularly as per the texts noted in §1.1.1, the statement of the early-late distinction in AA, 
according to which the early phase was there characterized. Its task is to present the analytic 
and systematic methods by which the aesthetic philosophies of EAA figures function, 
especially in comparison to those of LAA. This shall be accomplished in a piecewise fashion, 
by which, first, an overview of each figure’s philosophy (as per the essays noted here) shall 
be presented, then, second and third, the analytic and systematic methods employed 
throughout that presentation shall be examined using the tools offered by Beaney in §1.3.1,  
a primer on analysis, and Winfield in §1.3.2, a primer on system, as well as myself in §2.1.4, 
the statement of the unitary-plenary distinction. A general conclusion shall follow.  
 
3.1.1 Isenberg (1950)2 
Isenberg perhaps best befits the title of initiator of AA as a philosophical programme.  
It is through an asterism of citations throughout both EAA and LAA that his early work, 
much in correspondence with the Rockefeller Foundation (RF), establishes its influence. 
There are, generally, four sets of materials that may be taken as fundamental to Isenberg’s 
role within AA, these are what I shall call: (1) The Isenberg interview (1949) conducted  
in November by Gilpatric, the then RF Assistant Director of the Humanities;  
(2) The Isenberg report (1950)3 commissioned in June 1948 by resolution of the RF Executive 
Committee as part of an appraisal programme concerning the obscurity of scholarship in 
aesthetics and art criticism; (3) The ‘Aesthetics’ journal prospectus (1954) submitted in September 
to the RF for subsidy funding; and (4) Isenberg’s published essays (1944-1965).  
I shall emphasize the first three, with special emphasis on the 1950 report. 
In the interview (1949), Isenberg diagnoses the main errors in aesthetics at the time -- 
quantity without clarity -- and prescribes three steps for correcting them. The steps are:4 
 
                                                          
1 Given that the texts noted within this section (§3.1.1-§3.1.4) are almost exclusively collections, I have opted to 
focus on two exemplary essays per collection, supplemented by some of the other contents. Where an essay 
was published prior to its inclusion in the collection noted, I have cited it according to its original publication.  
2 On Isenberg, cf. Guyer (2014): 381-389. 
3  This paper is unpublished in full. It is a 48-page report submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation in April 1950; 
full title: Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art: A Report to the Rockefeller Foundation. There are two abridged 
publications of this paper: (1) pages 5-6, 14-28, 39-41, and 43-46 are published as Appendix A to Callaghan et 
al. (eds.), with excerpting by Mothersill; (2) pages 1-28 are published by Shusterman (ed.) in a JAAC special 
issue, with excerpting by Shusterman. Where there is need for distinction, I shall call these the ‘Mothersill 
publication’ (1973) and the ‘Shusterman publication’ (1987), respectfully; otherwise reference is to the original 
unabridged ‘Isenberg report’ (1950).  
The 1949 interview, 1950 report, and 1954 prospectus are provided courtesy of the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
4 Isenberg (1949): 1-2.  
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1  to identify and describe important topics or directions of aesthetic study; this shall 
entail a ‘general survey’ of work recently and currently underway. The aim is to 
correlate existing theories and methods;  
 
2 to encourage active communication and collaboration among top aestheticians; 
this shall entail the establishment of judgments and criteria through which existing 
work may be sorted according to use (or uselessness);  
 
3 to combine the theory and analysis done in philosophy with the criticism done in 
the arts.  
 
The first is demonstrated through the 1950 report, the second is demonstrated through the 
1954 prospectus, and the third is a general attitude representative of AA in toto and 
contributive to both 1 and 2.  
In the prospectus (1954), Isenberg and his associates propose the need for a new journal 
specific to philosophical aesthetics (hence the title ‘The Need for a New Journal of Aesthetics’)  
as distinct from both the ‘fine arts’ and the ‘philosophy of art’; in fact, ‘aesthetics’ here begins 
to garner a psychological bent,5 or perhaps less strongly, a Deweyan6 emphasis of the 
experiential. The impetus for this, so their proposal claims, is to fill a scholarly niche that 
needed filling, since only the JAAC then published specialized writings in aesthetics, yet it 
remained insufficient, as it catered to an array of subjects far wider than their scope:7 
 
“Aesthetics, too, needs some degree of concentration along lines of its own. [...] 
[I]n the English-speaking world today [1954] there is no organ[8] devoted 
primarily to philosophical studies in aesthetics...But a well-managed journal of 
aesthetics would furnish something that does not exist, [‘a new intellectual 
forum’], and bring out energies which are now scattered or frustrated.” 
 
Given that “Aesthetics is the study of the theoretical aspects of art and aesthetic experience”, 
the journal is proposed in order to bring specifics in the ‘fine arts’ and the ‘philosophy of art’ 
“into connection with the problems and issues of the field [of aesthetics] or used to illustrate 
some theoretical thesis”,9 the inclusion of which reflects one of Isenberg’s key points within the 
report, directly out of which this prospectus derived. It was denied by the RF in a letter of 
October 1954.  
In the report, Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art (1950), Isenberg adopts an 
interesting intermediary standpoint regarding the mutual benefit of analytic and systematic 
methodologies:10 
                                                          
5 This is emphasized by a curious letter submitted to the RF by Beardsley (September 1950) in response to 
Isenberg’s report: “I agree completely with its main thesis. [...] I should have liked to see more stress on the 
importance of collaboration with psychologists. One of the functions of the analytic philosopher, I believe, is to 
help turn vague and confused questions...into experimental questions: that is, to help prepare them, and sort them 
out, so that they are susceptible of some sort of empirical, that is, psychological, investigation. [...] We ought to have in 
mind, as one of our goals, that of transforming these issues into more manageable ones, where we can point 
out more directly what sort of psychological evidence, if we could obtain it, would help us.” (formatted) 
6 Guyer (2014): 382.  
7 Isenberg et al (1954): 4.  
8  The sense of this word is unclear; note that the JAAC is named the ‘official organ’ of the American Society for 
Aesthetics, and Ethics is named the ‘special organ’ of the field of ethics. 
9 Isenberg et al (1954): 3; formatted.  
10 Isenberg (1950): 13.  
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“We have, then, a first question as to the methods of the art studies and the 
subject (called ‘methodology’...) that studies those methods. [...] The line of 
inquiry is ‘metalinguistic’: it is about criticism or art history or stylistics; it does 
not fall within any of these domains. It belongs in fact to philosophy.” 
 
Here, Isenberg describes a shift in level: from the first-order content of (e.g.) some art-form x, 
to the second-order content of the methods of x (perhaps including the criticism or history of x), 
to the third-order content of the methodology of x (the study of the subject of method of x).  
It is from this standpoint that the analytical-aesthetical work is to be done; his conception of 
analysis is:11 
 
“Philosophical analysis is a method of clarifying ideas by revealing their essential 
constituents...to study a thing by breaking it up into its parts. [...] A distinguishing 
feature of philosophical analysis (though there are others) is that it analyses 
concepts or ideas. [...] [We] are not looking for information so much as for an 
explication of meaning. Analysis is supposed to satisfy their queries by 
providing acceptable definitions. Ideas have logical relations with other ideas; 
hence the analysis of one idea is apt to involve the analysis of others. [...] A 
really successful analysis of any important concept would result in a whole theory 
or system of a subject.” 
 
“Philosophical aesthetics is an analysis of the concepts and principles of 
criticism and other aesthetic studies, such as the psychology of art.” 
 
Here, Isenberg presents an analytical -- that is, a logical and metaphysical -- outlook 
borrowed directly from Moore. Yet his definition of ‘system’, as a whole theory deriving 
from analytic methodologies is perhaps something new -- the question remains as to what 
establishes or maintains this ‘system’, and whether it is something like a Moorean 
unanalyzable kernel. Seven works are noted by Isenberg as displaying “powers of critical 
appreciation” which are, themselves, empirically verifiable powers that Isenberg attributes to 
the presence of some particular theoretical element:12 
 
“[O]ver and above its collection of facts and insights, each work is built around 
a theory, a hypothesis, a general idea. [...] I have classed these works together because 
of the presence in each of this theoretical element together with the commoner 
critical and historical motives.” 
 
“Now in even the most backward of the sciences, general ideas...would attach 
themselves to earlier ideas as corollaries, generalizations, revisions, or refutations. [...] 
There is, indeed, an appearance of continuity and progress...[but] no real 
advance towards truth. Ideas, instead of being incorporated within a persistent 
intellectual effort where other ideas can be mounted upon them, fall into a 
miscellaneous ‘tradition’ where they affect each other by invisible shoves and 
electric shocks. [...] The hybridity of these works is at the very opposite pole 
from a genuine synthesis of methods or subject matters...”  
 
                                                          
11 Isenberg (1950): 4, 9; formatted.  
12 Isenberg (1950): 21-22, 24; formatted.  
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It appears, then, that the mere presence of some central element is insufficient for analysis to 
yield a ‘whole theory’ or ‘system’ or ‘synthesis of methods’, given that so-called ‘hybridity’ 
results when the parts of the analysandum interconnect in aggregative and disintegrative ways. 
It is precisely the incorporation within an intellectual effort and the mounting of ideas that 
yield a synthesized system in Isenberg’s relevant sense and saves its elements from merely 
hybridizing and becoming traditional. For Isenberg, then, it appears that the onus must 
remain where it began: on methodology, and its explicit and internal articulation and 
collaborative development:13 
 
“Now it is certainly true that no philosophical analysis can devise methods 
which it imposes on a science from the outside. Every idea of method must 
come from the study of methods already employed in the field. An explicit 
formulation of method, then, can lead to a greater awareness of direction or 
aim. [...] We can at once draw a conclusion for the theory and practice of 
criticism. A good theory of criticism should not and could not reform critical practice 
from the ground up.” 
 
This includes himself. We therefore come to Isenberg’s ‘double-project’:  
 
1  An internal, negative project: a project internal to APSA which negatively criticizes 
the then-current errors of aesthetics; primarily prescriptive, this project details what 
aesthetics ought to do or be like but is not, and describes it so.  
 
2  An external, positive project: a project external to APSA which positively undertakes 
the then-current issues of aesthetics; primarily descriptive, this project details what 
aesthetics really is when properly undertaken, and prescribes it so. 
 
Isenberg engages in each of these projects, detailing the first through his report and the 
second through his other published essays.  
 
3.1.2 Elton (1954)14 
In The Function of Philosophical Aesthetics (1948), Gallie lists six statements which abbreviate the 
main tenets of idealist aesthetics, and attributes to them the idealist commitment of reducing 
the “triadic situation” of (1) artist, (2) artwork, and (3) appreciation to “unity -- to a monadic 
act”, namely, imagination or Spirit.15 He calls this a ‘one-‘act’’ idealist aesthetics.16 This, per Gallie, 
indicates a misunderstanding of how to appreciate artworks (or language or symbolism),  
and provides an alternative theory which demonstrates much of the best art to be not of the 
‘one-act’ sort, thereby collapsing that version of idealist aesthetics.17 Integral to Gallie’s 
alternative is the notion of the ‘interpretant’, its ubiquity in art and entire neglect by idealist 
aesthetics.18 In light of the idealist tendency to commit the essentialist fallacy,19 Gallie offers 
                                                          
13 Isenberg (1950): 19-20.  
14 On Gallie, cf. Guyer (2014): 455-457; on Passmore, cf. 450-452. 
15 Gallie (1948): 306.  
16 Gallie (1948): 309.  
17 Gallie (1948): 308-309.  
18 Gallie (1948): 311.  
19 Gallie (1948): 302.  
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three further alternatives to idealist (and naturalist) aesthetics, what I shall call: (1) the attitude 
of informed scepticism, according to which art will be denied a common usage and art criticism 
will be used to identify art’s uniqueness rather than its so-called essence;20 (2) the ‘card-index’ 
approach to criticism, according to which critical tools (e.g. analogy) are investigated to 
determine the point at which they become contradictive or confused;21 and (3) the journeyman’s 
aesthetics, according to which one “tak[es] up work where work is to be done, whether at the 
explicit request of criticism or no”, such that no critical claim is to be made as applying to all 
particulars of a given art-form, and certainly not art itself.22  
 
In The Dreariness of Aesthetics (1951), Passmore, in response to and agreement with Wisdom 
(1948), declares contemporary aesthetics to be ‘dull’ and ‘dreary’ on account of a ‘wooly’ 
subject-matter, concealed by idealist artists and theories of art.23 To undo this ‘wooliness’ and 
the ‘dreariness’ it brings, Passmore suggests “ruthlessness in making distinctions”, that is,  
in distinguishing, rather than a subject-matter called ‘philosophy of art’, only the 
‘philosophies of the arts’, given that there is no such thing as philosophical aesthetics  
(in general), as there are no aesthetic properties unique to all art (in general).24 The error,  
for Passmore, is in generalization, as it is for Hampshire, who ends Logic and Appreciation 
(1952) with the aphoristic: “when in aesthetics one moves from the particular to the general, 
one is travelling in the wrong direction”.25 
 
3.1.3 Margolis (1962)26 
In The Role of Theory in Aesthetics (1956) Weitz adopts the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘family 
resemblances’ which he used to deny an essentialist definition to ‘game’:27 
 
“Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. [...]What is 
common to them all? -- Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or they 
would not be called ‘games’’ -- but look and see whether there is anything 
common to all. -- For if you look at them you will not see something that is 
common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. 
[...] And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression to 
characterize these similarities that ‘family resemblances’...And I shall say: ‘games’ 
form a family.” 
 
in order to deny an essentialist or real definition to ‘art’. To do so, per Weitz, as in aesthetic 
theory, is to improperly conceive the concept of ART as closed rather than logically open.28  
                                                          
20 Gallie (1948): 313.  
21 Gallie (1948): 316. 
22 Gallie (1948): 317.  
23 Passmore (1951): 320, 325.  
24 Passmore (1951): 330-331.  
25 Hampshire (1952) see (1954): 169.  
26 On Weitz, cf. Guyer (2014): 457-460.  
27 Wittgenstein (1953): 31e-32e; formatted.  
28 Weitz (1956): 30.  
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An ‘open concept’ is one which is emendable, requiring a decision on one’s part to extend the 
use of the concept; as such, it admits of no necessary nor sufficient conditions.29  
He therefore replaces such a notion with ‘criteria of recognition’ and ‘criteria of evaluation’, none of 
which are defining as such, but permit of Wittgensteinian resemblances and justification by 
reasons.30 Weitz concludes:31 
 
“Thus, the role of theory [in art] is not to define anything but to use the 
definitional form...to pin-point a crucial recommendation to turn our attention 
once again to the plastic elements in [e.g.] painting”. 
 
Later, in Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics (1973) and The Opening Mind (1977), Weitz notes that open 
concepts as such admit of categories, and distinguishes: (1) perennially flexible,  
(2) perennially debatable, (3) irreducibly vague, and two type of criterial -- (4) necessary but 
not sufficient, and (5) sufficient but not necessary -- logical kinds of open concept.  
Gallie’s Art as an Essentially Contested Concept (1956b), an application of an earlier essay titled 
Essentially Contested Concepts (1956a), comes to a similar conclusion, characterizing the concept 
ART as ‘essentially contested’ because of how its nature alters with socio-cultural changes, 
rather than because of the openness of its logical nature. 
 
In What Makes a Situation Aesthetic? (1957), Urmson asks whether aesthetic judgment can be 
distinguishable from judgments of other kinds (e.g. moral, personal, economic, intellectual, 
religious, etc.), and offers an account whereby these “should all be understood as being 
appraisals distinguished by their concentration on...some special subset of criteria of value of a certain 
sort of thing”, rather than by some fundamentum divisionis.32 Urmson concludes with a 
functionalist aesthetics, offering two aesthetic criteria whereby an aesthetic situation could be 
judged to be aesthetic: (1) sensible qualities, and (2) attempt to possess some non-aesthetic 
property; both of these are cases of ‘seeming somehow’.33 That the point of view from which 
a situation is judged matters, emphasizes a specific type of relation within that situation, 
thereby making each a logical situation.34 
 
3.1.4 Barrett (1965)35 
In Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake? (1958), Kennick describes two ways by which 
to answer in the affirmative: (1) essentialism,36 and (2) that criticism presupposes standards.37 
Regarding the former, Kennick borrow the Wittgensteinian argument that by looking and seeing 
                                                          
29 Weitz (1956): 30-31.  
30 Weitz (1956): 33-35.  
31 Weitz (1956): 35.  
32 Urmson (1957): 83.  
33 Urmson (1957): 89.  
34 Urmson (1957): 79. 
35 On Kennick, cf. Guyer (2014): 460-462; on Sibley, cf. 499-506.  
36 Kennick (1958): 319.  
37 Kennick (1958): 325.  
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we are incapable of finding Art in some unitary sense;38 this is a problem with the concept, 
rather than with the extension, of ART, namely, its ‘complex logic’ and ‘variety of uses’.39  
Yet he offers the so-called ‘warehouse thought experiment’ whereby someone is instructed to 
remove all the artworks contained within a warehouse full of miscellanies; Kennick maintains 
that this would be accomplished “with reasonable success” despite having “no satisfactory 
definition of Art in terms of some common denominator”.40 He maintains also that 
instructing to remove all the works with some definitive feature (e.g. significant form) would 
be less successful. Kennick concludes that: “there is no one use which we make of all works 
of art, nor is there any one demand or set of demands which we make on them”.41 
 
In Aesthetic Concepts (1959), Sibley contrasts aesthetic with non-aesthetic concepts, according 
to whether the concepts require taste, such that the former do and the latter do not.42  
Sibley argues that aesthetic concepts are not rule- or condition- governed, and that this is a 
logical feature of aesthetic judgment in general.43 He argues also that aesthetic terms are 
applied because of discernible features that are themselves non-aesthetic,44 and often 
attributable on account of samples, examples, and precedents.45 Sibley then provides seven 
methods by which the critic directs our attention to the specific aesthetic qualities she 
intends.46  
 
3.2 Analysis in Early Anglophone Aesthetics 
The varieties of analysis at play throughout EAA vary among its figures; I shall take each in 
turn, beginning with Isenberg’s double-project.  
Isenberg’s internal project is of the regressive mode. Analytic regression is evident by 
his search for fundamental principles or premises, particularly of kinds of criticism  
(i.e. aesthetic criticism, criticism in the arts, etc.), which includes the class of ‘theoretical’ 
elements that Isenberg attributes to the systematicity that he considers so imperative to 
proper theorizing. His external project is of the resolutive-cum-transformative mode, made 
clear by his conceptions of analysis reiterated above.  
Gallie’s, Passmore’s, and Sibley’s analytical methods are, likewise, primarily of the 
resolutive mode. Analytic resolution is evident in each by, per Gallie, his dissolution unto 
and limitation to particulars according to his ‘journeyman’s’ aesthetics; per Passmore, his 
eliminativist whole-part analysis of philosophical aesthetics into the philosophies of the arts, 
                                                          
38 Kennick (1958): 319.  
39 Kennick (1958): 320.  
40 Kennick (1958): 322.  
41 Kennick (1958): 333.  
42 Sibley (1959): 421-422.  
43 Sibley (1959): 436-437. 
44 Sibley (1959): 424. 
45 Sibley (1959): 431.  
46 Sibley (1959): 442-444.  
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according to art-form; and per Sibley, his individuation of concept-types and elucidation of 
relation-types between them.  
Weitz’s, Urmson’s, and Kennick’s analytical methods are, likewise also, primarily of 
the transformational mode. Analytical transformation is evident in each by, per Weitz and 
Kennick, the re-conceptualization of the concept of art as one that logically admits of no 
definition being ‘open’ or having a ‘complex logic’ (Gallie, on account of his ‘essentially 
contested concept’ is included here as well), and per Urmson, the contextualization of criteria 
of value as dependent upon the point-of-view from which a judgment is made.  
 
3.3 System in Early Anglophone Aesthetics 
The variety of system at play throughout EAA is indeed a plenary systematicity. Each of the 
accounts noted above entails resolutive analysis to some degree, whether noted as such or 
not (often by way of rejecting essentialism and generalization in favor of particularity), 
thereby yielding mutually-independent constituents logically related in some way. That their 
philosophies are taken to be systems in the minimal sense that paintings are said to be,47 and 
that none is defined in terms of the relations of its parts to some privileged kernel or indexes 
to some unanalyzable element, the figures of EAA, as presented here in brief, may be said to 
be plenary-systematic (and not unitary-systematic).  
A brief note on Isenberg, however. Though it may prima facie seem that Isenberg’s 
internal project tends toward unitary systematicity on account of his search for some (single) 
‘theoretical element’, it does not. This is because, what Isenberg locates at this position is not 
an unanalyzable element, but a collaborative, explicit, and internal articulation of method. This is,  
by definition, analyzable and logically complex. Given also Isenberg’s conception of ‘system’ 
as a ‘whole theory’ resulting from analysis, I find his use of ‘system’ to be more like than 
unlike ‘synthesis’, which has already been characterized as the converse entailment of 
analysis. That he, in the quotations above, limits his conception of philosophical analysis to 
the resolutive mode is inconsequential, as it is his philosophy itself that concerns us here.  
 
3.4 Conclusion to Chapter 3 
The task of this chapter was to present the analytic and systematic methods by which the 
aesthetic philosophies of EAA figures function, especially in comparison to those of LAA. 
This was to be investigated in light of the dynamic proposed in §1.2, the statement of the 
problem and thesis of this dissertation: that the resolution of the PSI is explainable by a 
swapping of priority between EAA and LAA concerning the notions of analyticity and 
systematicity; it was hypothesized that EAA positioned analysis as primary and system as 
secondary. This appears to have been a proper assessment of EAA, given that the figures 
noted above systematize only incidentally in order to formulate their analyses, rather than vice versa.  
                                                          
47 Cf. §2.1.4. 
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It has been shown that the major analytical methods at play throughout EAA are 
identifiable as those at play throughout analytic philosophy after the AT and LT, according 
to Beaney’s set-of-modes and the assessment that analytic philosophy (including EAA)  
is characterizable as a synthesis between paraphrastic-transformative and reductive-resolutive 
modes of analysis, with slight dominance of the former over the latter. This is our conclusion 
of secondary importance.  
It has also been shown that the major systematic method at play throughout EAA is 
identifiable as a plenary systematicity. This is our conclusion of primary importance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Late Anglophone Aesthetics 
 
 
4.1 Introduction to Late Anglophone Aesthetics1 
This chapter, like the one before, is a survey of the aesthetic philosophies of LAA figures, 
particularly as per the texts noted in §1.1.1, the statement of the early-late distinction in AA, 
according to which the late phase was there characterized. Its task is to present the analytic 
and systematic methods by which the aesthetic philosophies of LAA figures function, 
especially in comparison to those of EAA. This shall be accomplished in a piecewise fashion, 
by which, first, an overview of each figure’s philosophy (as per the texts noted here) shall be 
presented, then, second and third, the analytic and systematic methods employed throughout 
that presentation shall be examined using the tools offered by Beaney in §1.3.1, a primer on 
analysis, and Winfield in §1.3.2, a primer on system, as well as myself in §2.1.4, the statement 
of the unitary-plenary distinction. A general conclusion shall follow.  
 
4.1.1 Danto (1964)2 
In The Artworld (1964), and much since, Danto’s aesthetics concerns the metaphysical and 
epistemological commitments of a new artistic modernist property: indiscernibility between  
art-objects and real-objects. This property involves various species, including:3 (1) artworks 
that appear to be other artworks, despite being separate art-objects;4 (2) artworks that appear 
to be real-objects, despite not being so (indiscernibles);5 (2) artworks that have real-objects as 
part of themselves (collage and combines);6 and (4) artworks that were or are unaltered  
real-objects (readymades).7 Danto describes indiscernibility as follows:8   
 
“Clearly, there were no manifest overarching similarities in this partial 
class of artworks [indiscernibles]. But equally clearly, neither could we 
pick out which was the artwork in an indiscernible pair, and which was 
not. But this was in principle perfectly general: for any non-artwork, an 
artwork could be imagined which resembled it as closely as might be required. And 
for any artwork, a non-artwork could be imagined like it to whatever 
degree…The answer was that one could not tell by looking.” 
 
                                                          
1 Exegetical material within this section (§4.1.1-§4.1.3) has been revised and reprinted here from previous essays, 
with permission by the Graduate Tutor; all work presented is my own, unless otherwise cited.  
2 On Danto, cf. Guyer (2014): 464-468, 481-498.  
3 Cf. §2.1.1, footnote 16.  
4 E.g. Danto (1964): 577; (1981): 121-123: ‘Newton’s First Law’ and ‘Newton’s Third Law.’ 
5 E.g. Warhol (1964): Brillo Box[es].   
6 E.g. Rauschenberg (1955): Bed. Cf. Danto (1964): 576. “[N]ot every part of an artwork A is part of a real object 
R when R is part of A and can, moreover, be detached from A and seen merely as R. The mistake thus far will 
have to mistake A for part of itself, namely R, even though it would not be incorrect to say that A is R...”  
7 E.g. Duchamp (1917): Fountain. 
8 Danto (1998): 129-130; formatted. 
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Danto’s earliest attempt to elucidate what came to be called ‘the problem of indiscernibles’ was to 
specify a new type of logical copula, an identifier called the ‘is’ of artistic identification:9  
 
In ‘that a is b,’ “the a stands for some specific physical property of, or physical 
part of, an object; and, finally, it is a necessary condition for something to be an 
artwork that some part or property of it be designable by the subject of a 
sentence that employs this special is.” 
 
This is not the ‘is’ of identity, predication, existence, or simple identification, but rather the 
identifier in statements about art and artworks, as well as marginal and mythical statements; it 
is perhaps nearest to the ‘is’ of symbolism, and as such, indeterminable by way of the 
manifest features of the object(s) to which it applies, but requires something else, like context 
or narrative or stipulation -- something relational. This led to Danto’s aphorism:10   
 
“To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry --  
an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.”  
 
It is therefore the artworld that determines both artistic identification and definition, and as 
such, the difference between art-objects and real-objects, thereby solving the problem posed 
by the new pop art idiom. Danto’s later attempts at formulating an historicist, artworld-based 
definition of art may be principally found in two publications -- essay (1974) and book (1981) 
-- both titled The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Danto consults the artworld to determine 
the status of three indiscernibles: (1) one about nothing, (2) one not about anything, and  
(3) one neither about nothing nor about anything.11 He thereby defines two crucial 
considerations for a general definition of art: aboutness and embodiment;12 aboutness is what 
artworks possess when they are treated representationally, i.e. the art-object has meaning that 
an indiscernible real-object does not have, and embodiment is what artworks express when 
they are treated interpretively, i.e. the art-object embodies meaning when it is so interpreted. 
Per Danto, then, a proper ‘philosophy of art history’ entails three levels:13 
 
1 General definition of art: a real or essentialist definition of art true at all times and at 
all places; concerns art in general.  
 
2 Particular theories of artworks: theories of how the art of a particular time or a 
particular place satisfies the general definition of art; concerns this artwork. 
 
3 Interpretation of artworks: an interpretation of meaning within the particular theory 
of artworks; concerns this artwork.  
 
This ‘triply cognitivist’ conception therefore frames the artworld as a class of members who 
understand level 1, know the means by which level 2 may satisfy 1, and act of level 3 in light 
                                                          
9 Danto (1964): 576-577.  
10 Danto (1964): 580; formatted.  
11 Danto (1974): 140.  
12 Danto (1974): 148; (1981): 165; (1998): 130; (2013): 48, here ‘embodied meaning’ becomes ‘wakeful dreams’. 
13 Guyer (2014): 482, 485. 
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of such knowledge.14 This was originally schematized when Danto (1964) first sketched the 
beginnings of a matrix that would come to depict the predicative contents of the artworld:15 
 
“I am now interested in the K-relevant predicates for the class K of 
artworks. [The class of pairs of opposites that sensibly apply to the (ô)Ko 
I shall designate as the class of K-relevant predicates. And a necessary 
condition for an object to be of a kind K is that at least one pair of K-
relevant opposites be sensibly applicable to it. But, in fact, if an object is 
of kind K, at least and at most one of each K-relevant pair of opposites 
applies to it.]16 And let F and non-F be an opposite pair of such 
predicates…[A]ll works up to a given time might be G, it never 
occurring to anyone until that time that something might both be an 
artwork and non-G; indeed, it might have been thought that G was a 
defining trait of artworks when in fact something might first have to be an 
artwork before G is sensibly predicable of it -- in which case non-G 
might also be predicable of artworks, and G itself then could not have 
been a defining trait of this class.  
Let G be ‘is representational’ and let F be ‘is expressionist’. At a given 
time, these and their opposites are perhaps the only art-relevant 
predicates in critical use. [An object must first be of a certain kind before 
either of a pair of opposites applies to it...If F and non-F are opposites, 
an object o must be of a certain kind K before either of these sensibly 
applies; but if o is a member of K, then o either is F or non-F, to the 
exclusion of the other.]17 Now letting ‘+’ stand for a given predicate P 
and ‘-’ for its opposite non-P, we may construct a style matrix...: 
 
F 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
G 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
 
The rows determine available styles, given the active critical vocabulary: 
representational expressionistic...; representational nonexpressionistic...; 
nonrepresentational expressionistic...; nonrepresentational non-
expressionist...[S]uppose an artist determines that H shall henceforth be 
artistically relevant for his paintings. Then, in fact, both H and non-H 
become artistically relevant for all painting, and if his is the first and only 
painting that is H, every other painting in existence becomes non-H, and 
the entire community of paintings is enriched, together with a doubling 
of the available style opportunities...The greater the variety of artistically 
relevant predicates, the more complex the individual members of the 
artworld become; and the more one knows of the entire population of 
the artworld, the richer one’s experience with any of its members. 
In this regard, notice that, if there are m artistically relevant 
predicates, there is always a bottom row with m minuses. This row is apt 
to be occupied by purists. Having scoured their canvasses clear of what 
they regard as inessential, they credit themselves with having distilled out 
the essence of art. But this is just their fallacy: exactly as many artistically 
relevant predicates stand true of their[s]...stand true of any member of 
the Artworld, and they can exist as artworks only insofar as ‘impure’ 
paintings exist.” 
 
                                                          
14 Guyer (2014): 482, 485.  
15 Danto (1964): 582-584. 
16 Danto (1964): 582. 
17 Danto (1964): 582. These are neither contraries nor contradictories, but opposites. 
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The matrix is composed of ‘artistically relevant predicates’ (columns) and artistic ‘styles’ 
(rows) determined by the interplay of the predicates. The predicates themselves denote 
artistic developments by predicating of their constituent artworks particular features of the 
artworks themselves, historically assigning the predicate as the ‘defining trait’ of its 
corresponding movement; (i.e. the predicate G, ‘is representational,’ introduced by 
representationalist artworks, viz. representational features, defines representationalism; 
likewise, the predicate F, ‘is expressionist,’ introduced by expressionist artworks, viz. 
expressive features, defines expressionism; and so forth.) As per art history, artistic styles 
result from the ways in which the movements compare. Danto codifies this by introducing 
the opposite predicates of P and non-P, denoted by ‘+’ and ‘-’ respectively. The role of these 
signs is not only to differentiate the predicates of artistic styles, but also to identify a final 
row of so-called ‘purist’ artworks. For however many artistically relevant predicates  
(call this n), there will be an equal number of minuses in this bottom ‘purist’ row (call this m), 
and the total number of artistic styles available will be calculable as 2n (call this s), hence:  
for every n predicates, m = n and s = 2n. This is shown below: 
 
 
 
This matrix is the initial way in which Danto diagrammatizes the artworld. Although his 
historical theory of art is dichotomic insofar as it specifies two main stages of art -- the first 
imitative, and the second non-imitative, thereby categorizing art’s history into representationalist 
(G) and expressionist (F) stages -- Danto does retain the possibility of expanding the matrix, 
concluding that “[a]n artistic breakthrough consists...in adding the possibility of a column  
[a new artistically relevant predicate] to the matrix”;18 however this expansion is not infinite. 
Danto’s conception of art history is a (neo-Hegelian) historical narrative. It progresses through 
two historical stages, where the second is an inversion of the first, followed by a third  
post-historical stage, whereof progression is necessitated by inconsistencies that arise in each:19  
 
1 Imitation (or mimetic) theory: a representationalist approach, defines art-objects as 
perfect imitations of non-art-objects; however, this also makes them aesthetically 
and metaphysically redundant, so fails. 
 
                                                          
18 Danto (1964): 584. 
19 Danto (1984): 86-99, 104-109, 111.  
(n  = 2) F G
+ + ← 'rep. exp.'
+ - ← 'nonrep. exp.'    'impure'
- + ← 'rep. nonexp.'
(m  = 2) - - ← 'nonrep. nonexp.'    'pure'
EXP. REP.      (s  = 4)
'is exp' 'is rep'
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2 Non-imitation (or real-thing) theory: an expressionist approach, defines art-objects as 
entities distinct from non-art-objects, being real-objects themselves; however, this 
merely reabsorbs them back into reality, so fails. 
 
3 Transfigurative (or art-concept) theory: a conceptual approach, requires interpretation 
of artworks as contextualized within the artworld; necessitated and exemplified by 
artistic modernism. 
 
The conceptualization of art required here marks the final stage of art’s narrative history of 
realizing what art is; after, this becomes the duty of philosophy. The post-historical stage, 
marked by the artworld, exemplifies the Hegelian-Dantoan notion of the end of art as ‘the end 
of art history as such’, that is, the end of any single metanarrative for art’s future history.20 
Per Danto, then, in After the End of Art (1997), the end-of-art thesis describes the mutual 
divergence of art from philosophy,21 rather than, per Hegel, the transmutation of art into 
philosophy, suggesting that “philosophy itself may just be the disenfranchisement of art.”22  
 
4.1.2 Goodman (1968)23 
In Languages of Art (1968), Goodman’s aesthetics concerns the syntactic and semantic rules 
governing symbolization, properly defined. I shall confine myself, with exception, to the 
second part of the text, titled The Theory of Notation (§IV). His first priority is to divide the 
landscape of a symbol system into two domains:   
 
1 The symbol scheme: a collection of symbols (‘characters’) with rules for their 
combination into compound symbols (‘compound characters’), where the instances of 
a character are, generally, marks of that character. 
 
2 The field of reference: the class of objects (‘members’) that comply with the symbol 
scheme (‘compliance class’) with rules for their compliance.  
 
The rules which govern the symbol scheme are syntactic, and those which govern the field of 
reference (and its relation to the symbol scheme) are semantic; a general rule of unambiguity 
applies throughout. Goodman uses the term ‘compliance’ synonymously with ‘denotation’ and 
maintains that it “requires no special conformity,” so anything whatsoever that is denoted by a 
symbol complies with that symbol.24 Recall that, for Goodman, to symbolize is to refer, and that 
reference is a necessary condition for the depiction or description of an object;25 thus, 
reference remains imperative for the symbolization and depiction that occurs in the arts.  
For Goodman, there are two modes of direct26 reference: 
 
 
                                                          
20 Danto (1998): 140.  
21 Danto (1998): 134. 
22 Danto (1985): 176. 
23 On Goodman, cf. Guyer (2014): 411-427. 
24 Goodman (1968): 143-144. 
25 Goodman (1976): 40.  
26 This is to be differentiated from indirect reference (i.e., metaphor (II,8)).  
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1 Denotation (§I,1): reference simpliciter; the relation between a predicate, and the object 
that it predicates; here, it is the predicate which denotes.27 
 
2 Exemplification (§II,3): reference plus possession; a relationship between a predicate, 
and the object that it predicates, where that object demonstrates possession of that 
predicate; here, it is the object which exemplifies.28 
 
In the final section, Goodman reiterates his objective throughout the chapter, as well as a 
comprehensive definition of a notational system and the five properties required of one. 
Ultimately, Goodman’s objective is classificatory, to elucidate “features that distinguish 
notational systems -- good or bad -- from non-notational systems,”29 and he does so according to 
the argument that artistic symbol systems are generally non-notational,30 despite notational 
systems being theoretically possible.31 In a notational system, the onus is on the (theoretical) 
ability to draw clear lines between the inscriptions of a character to members of that character’s 
compliance class, without committing a lateral move into another character or compliance 
class. This is to be accomplished by appealing to five necessary requirements, characterized as 
syntactic and semantic. Hence, Goodman requires one-to-one correspondence and 
equivalency, per his definition of a notational system:32  
 
“A system is notational, then, if and only if all objects complying with inscriptions of 
a given character belong to the same compliance class and we can, theoretically, 
determine that each mark belongs to, and each object complies with inscriptions 
of, at most one particular character.” 
 
Goodman uses ‘notation’ synonymously with ‘notational scheme’ and ‘notational system’; 
however, this interchangeability does not extend to the terms ‘symbol’, ‘symbol scheme’, and 
‘symbol system’. This is on account of the unidirectional relation between that which makes 
something symbolic, and that which makes it notational, as Goodman notes that “[t]he symbol 
scheme of every notational system is notational, but not every symbol system with a notational 
scheme is [notational]”;33 thus schemes are notational, but systems are not necessarily so.  
This seems to be a result of the relationship that obtains between the scheme and application 
of that scheme to the field of reference within the overarching system.34  
Goodman’s point of departure is the so-called primary function of score-like systems.  
He begins by providing a functionalist account of a score, and how it differs from other 
systems, e.g. sketch or script. His focus is not limited to musical scores (or sketches or 
scripts), as it is concerning symbol systems that are organized like scores. The function of a 
score, according to Goodman, is one of identity: the score of a work is the authoritative 
                                                          
27 Goodman (1968): 5.  
28 Goodman (1968): 53.  
29 Goodman (1968): 156. 
30 Guyer (2014): 421. 
31 Cf. Goodman (1968): 194-198, e.g. painting.  
32 Goodman (1968): 156; formatted.  
33 Goodman (1968): 130; formatted.  
34 Goodman (1968): 130. 
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identification of that work among performances of it.35 This is the so-called primary function 
of a score as a score, and is from which the properties of a score, that it: (1) defines, or  
marks off the performances that do comply with the work from those that do not, and  
(2) uniquely determines, or relates scores and performances to one another, as well as to the 
work.36 The distinction between the ‘pointing-out’ facilitated by a score and the ‘pointing-
out’ facilitated by everyday ostension is that a score points without any ‘latitude’ permitted. 
Ostension might lead from an object (O1) to a label (L1) denoting that object, to another 
object (O2) that exemplifies L1, to another label (L2) that denotes O2, to another object (O3) 
that exemplifies L2, and so on, permitting a shift in latitude from O1 → O2 → O3 that is both 
misguiding and ambiguous semantically.37 Symbolization by way of a score avoids this by 
having every performance (P) exemplify every instance of the score (S), and every S 
exemplify the work (W), as well as having the W denote every S, and every S denote every P. 
That some forms of art lend themselves to systems of symbolization similar to that of a 
score -- allography -- and some do not -- autography -- prompts Goodman to devise a 
continuum upon which different forms of art (e.g. painting, sculpting, etc.), or symbolism 
(e.g. diagramming, mapping, etc.), may be placed.   
 
The hallmark of a character is that its various marks pose syntactic equivalency, that is to say, 
members of a character may be freely exchanged for one another, so long as this exchange has 
no syntactical effect.38 In light of this, Goodman names five necessary conditions, which admit 
of two (perhaps three) general classifications:39 
 
1  General requirement: unambiguity: one-to-one relations among instances of marks 
and: (1) the characters to which they belong (syntactically), or (2) the compliance 
classes of the characters to which they belong (semantically); Goodman defines 
unambiguity as a lack of ambiguity, in which these one-to-one relations change with 
context or time.  
 
2  Syntactic requirement 1: syntactic disjointness or indifference: one-to-one relations between 
marks and characters, such that characters are disjoint or non-overlapping.  
 
3  Syntactic requirement 2: syntactic differentiation: a measure of density between marks and 
characters, such that any two adjacent symbols are differentiable, with no third 
symbol between them to undifferentiate them.  
 
4  Semantic requirement 1: semantic differentiation: a measure of density between 
compliants and compliance classes, such that any two adjacent objects are 
differentiable, with no third object between them to undifferentiate them.  
 
5  Semantic requirement 2: semantic disjointness: one-to-one relations between 
characters and the compliance classes of the members they denote, such that 
compliance classes are disjoint or non-overlapping. 
 
                                                          
35 Goodman (1968): 128. 
36 Goodman (1968): 128-129. 
37 Goodman (1968): 129.  
38 Goodman (1968): 131. 
39 Goodman (1968): 147-148; 132, 135-136; 152. 
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Syntactic disjointness may be phrased in two directions: character ‘indifference’ applies to two 
marks that are of the same character (i.e. they are indifferent), whereas character ‘disjointness’ 
applies to two marks that are not of the same character (i.e. they are disjoint); both of these 
views comments on the same property -- syntactic equivalency -- of the marks and the 
characters to which they comply. Both syntactic requirements 1 and 2 may be illustrated by the 
mark ‘ԃ’.40 If the mark ‘ԃ’ belongs to both the first (‘a’) and fourth (‘d’) letters of the alphabet, 
such that “a” = “ԃ” = “d” and every ‘a’ and ‘d’ are equivalent to ‘ԃ’ and, therefore, to one 
another, then the two letter-classes (i.e. the ‘a-class’ and ‘d-class’) collapse into one character 
(i.e. ‘ԃ’ and its ‘ԃ-class’), permitting syntactical equivalence among them. The letters would no 
longer qualify as characters in a notation; syntactic requirement 1 would fail. If, however, the 
mark ‘ԃ’ belongs to the letter ‘a’ (or ‘d’) as equivalent to its miniscule and majuscule forms, 
such that “a” = “ԃ” = “A” (or “d” = “ԃ” = “D”), then the consistency of the marks ‘a’ and ‘A’ 
(or ‘d’ and ‘D’) across points in time is what differentiates them, regardless of sameness in 
shape, size, etc. The letters would no longer qualify as characters in a notation; syntactic 
requirement 2 would fail. Remaining loyal to the same notation throughout both time and 
space (qua unambiguity) prevents departure from these requirements, and as such, departure 
from the use of a notational system. Semantic requirement 2 may be illustrated by Goodman’s 
Figures 941 and 1042 (below), which illustrate two instances of overlap: (1) complete overlap, and 
(2) partial overlap between compliance classes (A′) and (B′) characters (A) and (B):  
 
Note how Goodman explains the interrelations among the parts:43  
 
“[Where] two different compliance-classes intersect [viz. Figure 9], some 
inscription [i] will have two compliants [k and h] such that one belongs to a 
compliance-class that the other does not; and a chain from compliant [k] to 
inscription [i] to compliant [h] will thus lead from a member [k] of one 
compliance-class [A′] to something [h] outside that class [in B′]…Where neither 
of two intersecting compliance-classes is included in the other [viz. Figure 10], a 
chain from compliant [h] to inscription [i] to compliant [k] to inscription [j] to 
compliant [m] may connect two objects [h and m] that do not even belong to 
any one compliance-class [common to neither A′ nor B′].”   
                                                          
40 Cf. Goodman (1968): 133, Figure 3. 
41 Goodman (1968): 149; adapted.  
42 Goodman (1968): 150; adapted.  
43 Goodman (1968): 150-151. 
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What we see here is a shift in latitude that results from everyday ostension, but is safeguarded 
against in the function of a score. Therefore, Goodman concludes that “any intersection of 
different compliance-classes defeats the primary purpose of a notational system,” that of 
identification.44 In conclusion, proper reference is therefore made between a character (A or B) 
and its compliance class (A′ or B′), marks (q or s) and compliants (r or t), by the following  
one-to-one organization:  
 
It is by this model that a system is indeed notational: all objects (r and t) complying with 
inscriptions (q and s) of a given character (A and B) belong to the same compliance class  
(A′ and B′), and it can be determined that each mark (q and s) belongs to, and each object  
(r and t) complies with inscriptions of, at most one particular character (viz. no intersection).45 
Yet, given that artistic or aesthetical systems are generally non-notational, the question 
remains as to what model they correspond. Reiterated in the essay titled ‘When is Art?’ in 
Ways of Worldmaking (1978), Goodman provides five ‘symptoms of the aesthetic’:46 
 
1  Syntactic density: a measure such that between any two adjacent symbols there is a 
third (or an infinite many) undifferentiating them; a difference in symbol results 
from the finest of syntactic difference.  
 
2  Syntactic or relative repleteness: a symbol has comparatively many significant aspects. 
 
3  Semantic density: a measure such that between any two adjacent objects there is a 
third (or an infinite many) undifferentiating them; a difference in object results 
from the finest of semantic difference.  
 
4  Exemplificationality: symbolization plus possession, specifically of the properties the 
symbol literally or metaphorically possesses; expression.  
 
5  Reference, multiple and complex: a symbol has several referential functions, some direct 
and some indirect. 
 
Per Goodman, “[a] symptom is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for, but merely 
tends in conjunction with other such symptoms to be present in, aesthetic experience” and 
                                                          
44 Goodman (1968): 151.  
45 Goodman (1968): 156. 
46 Goodman (1968): 252-253; (1978): 67-68.  
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“call for maximum sensitivity of discrimination”.47 The commonality toward which these 
symptoms tend, however, is a refocusing from the referent via the symbol to the symbol 
itself; this, the nontransparency of the artwork and the artwork as symbol, Goodman offers 
as a suggestion for defining art in terms of symbolic function.48 
 
4.1.3 Wollheim (1968)49 
In Art and Its Objects (1968), Wollheim’s aesthetics concerns the distinctive kind of visuo-
aesthetic experience one has when viewing a differentiated surface, demonstrated through his 
theory of representational seeing (1968), first called seeing-as (1968)50  and later called seeing-in 
(1980b).51 In short, seeing-in is a capacity of our perceptual apparatus to visualize  
three-dimensional pictorial space within the two-dimensional picture plane; it is within the 
pictorial space that depicted objects are seen, likewise, three-dimensionally despite their two-
dimensionality.52 (It is this capacity that was of focus throughout the case study in chapter 2.) 
This is initially introduced through the anecdote of a task asked by Hans Hofmann of his 
pupils. First, Wollheim provides Hofmann’s instruction to mark a canvas with black paint 
and observe how the black is on the white. (Call this the Hofmann Case.) Then, Wollheim 
provides a revised instruction to mark a canvas with blue paint and observe how the blue is 
behind the white. (Call this the Revised Hofmann Case.) The revision is provided to emphasize 
Wollheim’s contention that “what Hofmann’s pupils were asked to observe was not the fact 
that some black paint was physically on a white canvas,” but rather the representation-
contributive properties that the physically-black or physically-blue on the physically-white 
pose to our capacity for seeing-in:53 
 
“The sense in which ‘on’ was used in the original example and ‘behind’ in the 
revised example give us in an elementary form the notion of what it is to see 
something as a representation, or for something to have representational 
properties.” 
 
Iterated in Art and its Objects (1968) and reiterated in A Note on the Physical Object Hypothesis 
(1980a), Wollheim uses the ‘physical object hypothesis’ as his entrée into discussing art in 
physical, plastic terms. It is this that prompts his initial bifurcation of art forms into those 
where no physical object can be plausibly identified as the work of art (representationalism) 
and those where one can (presentationalism).54 Recall that Wollheim’s central problem is the 
simultaneity of attributing representational properties to a work of art and considering that 
work of art a physical object. It is to emphasize this problem that he revises the Hofmann 
Case, since the ‘behindedness’ of the blue mark more clearly illustrates the representative 
                                                          
47 Goodman (1968): 252.  
48 Cf. Goodman (1978): 69-70. 
49 On Wollheim, cf. Guyer (2014): 506-524; cf. A note on formalism (§2.1.2.1). 
50 Wollheim (1968): 16.  
51 Wollheim (1980b): 209.  
52 Wollheim (1994): 17-18.  
53 Wollheim (1968): 15. 
54 Wollheim (1968): 4-5.  
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character of artistic depiction than does the ‘onness’ of the black mark.55 This is part of 
Wollheim’s general argument against a version of idealist-expressivist aesthetics, called the 
Gombrich argument. In short, this holds that a particular plastic feature of an artwork is 
significant only if regarded as an intended selection from a set of alternatives -- the artist’s 
‘repertoire.’56 The idea is that, for instance, the black mark in the Hofmann Case or the blue 
mark in the Revised Hofmann Case have no significance in themselves, but that black-rather-
than-blue or blue-rather-than-black has.57 The error of conceptualizing the role of formal 
qualities in artistic depiction in this way may be illustrated through the following case:  
to mark a canvas with red paint and observe that it is neither black nor blue. (Call this the 
Extended Hofmann Case.) This mark could indeed be seen representationally in the same way 
as either the Hofmann Case or the Revised Hofmann Case, that is, with the red on or behind 
the white. Knowledge of the repertoire, that is, that the Extended Hofmann Case is  
red-rather-than-black or red-rather-than-blue is irrelevant. And, I maintain, would remain so, 
were the ‘rather-than’ relation used here (e.g.) morphologic and not chromatic  
(i.e. horizontal-rather-than-vertical or circular-rather-than-linear). The expressive features of 
a work are, in this way, inapplicable to the features contributive to representation or 
representational seeing, and since it is representation that gives artistic depiction significance, 
the Gombrich argument fails.58 Maintaining adamancy on the physicality of the artwork 
while also maintaining that artworks cannot be merely physical distinguishes Wollheim’s 
‘psychological’ aesthetics from contemporaries who locate the artwork in (e.g.) linguistic 
meaning.59 In Painting as an Art (1987), Wollheim identifies three fundamental perceptual 
capacities (in the spectator) from which the three basic powers of painting (in the artwork, 
from the artist) derive:60 
 
1  A representational aspect: the capacity for seeing-in derives the power to represent 
external objects; 
 
2  An expressive aspect: the capacity for expressive perception derives the power to express 
internal phenomena; 
 
3  A pleasurable aspect: the capacity for visual delight derives the power to induce pleasure 
of a special sort; 
 
This threefold aesthetics reflects a synthesis of three themes prominent throughout modern 
aesthetics, including: the cognitivist, the expressionist, and the imaginative (play) theories of 
art.61 Yet part of what individuates his work is the import he maintains of the medium.  
 
 
                                                          
55 Wollheim (1968): 21. 
56 Wollheim (1980b): 213; (1968): 57.  
57 Cf. Wollheim (1968): 57-58. 
58 Cf. Wollheim (1968): 58-59; (1980b): 213-214.  
59 Guyer (2014): 509.  
60 Wollheim (1987): 45. 
61 Guyer (2014): 513.  
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Twofoldness or the twofold thesis is a principle of “attend[ing] simultaneously to object and 
medium.”62 Wollheim introduces this principle as a requirement for appropriate 
representational seeing, and to distinguish seeing-in from seeing-as, despite his initial 
conflation of the terms. The two things between which visual attention is (perhaps 
unequally) distributed are: (1) the medium or thing representing (=x), and (2) the object or thing 
represented (=y); in short, the distinction to be made is that, in seeing-as, x is seen as y, 
whereas in seeing-in, y is seen in x.63 The difference may be prima facie subtle, but Wollheim 
holds to a crucial phenomenological asymmetry, since “what the representation is seen as is 
never the same as what is seen in the representation.”64 In Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and Pictorial 
Representation (1980b), Wollheim notes three considerations for differentiating the 
Wollheimian notion of seeing-in from the Wittgensteinian notion of seeing-as: (1) whereas 
seeing-as entails particulars, seeing-in entails particulars and states-of-affairs;65  
 
“If I am looking at x, and x is a particular, I can see f in x, and I can also see in 
x that an f is g-ing: but, whereas I can see x as an f, I cannot see x as that an f is 
g-ing.”  
 
(2) whereas seeing-as entails a localization requirement, seeing-in does not;66 
 
“If I see x as y, then there is always some part (up to the whole) of x that I see 
as y. Further, if I claim to see x as y -- and I may see x as y without claiming to 
do so, indeed without knowing that I do so -- then I must be able to specify 
just which part of x, or whether it isn’t the whole of x, that I allegedly see as y ... 
I may see y in x without there being any answer to the question whereabouts in 
x I can see y, and consequently without my being obliged to produce any such 
answer in support of the claim I might make to see y in x.”  
 
and (3) whereas seeing-in permits twofoldness, seeing-as does not;67 
 
“If I see x as y there will be certain features of x that permit me to see it, or 
explain my seeing it, as y. These features, I shall say, are the sustaining features 
of my seeing x as y, and the restrictions upon simultaneous attention in the case 
of seeing-as may be expressed by saying that I cannot simultaneously see x and 
y and be visually aware of the features of x sustaining this perception. [...] I may 
very well be able to see y in x and yet there be no delimitable features of x that 
can be looked upon as sustaining features of my doing so. However, in those 
cases where there are sustaining features of my seeing y in x, then seeing-in 
contrasts with seeing-as in that I can simultaneously be visually aware of the y in 
x and the sustaining features of this perception.” 
 
The exemplar of seeing-as is Jastrow’s duck-rabbit, which may be seen as either a duck or a 
rabbit, tertium non datur. Wittgenstein depicts this in Philosophical Investigations (1953) in the 
                                                          
62 Wollheim (1980b): 213.  
63 Wollheim (1980b): 209. 
64 Wollheim (1980b): 226; formatted.  
65 Wollheim (1980b): 210, cf. 222; cf. 210 re: ‘nominalization argument’:  ‘to see x as the f’s g-ing’ or ‘an f g-ing.’ 
66 Wollheim (1980b): 211, cf. 222. 
67 Wollheim (1980b): 213, cf. 223.  
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following manner, through a series (at least 12) of what I shall call ‘moments’:68  
 
“I am shewn the duck-rabbit and asked what it is; I may say ‘It’s a duck-
rabbit’...The answer that it is a duck-rabbit is again the report of a perception; the 
answer ‘Now it’s a rabbit’ is not. Had I replied ‘It’s a rabbit’, the ambiguity 
would have escaped me, and I should have been reporting my perception. [...] Of 
course we can say: There are certain things which fall equally under the concept 
‘picture-rabbit’ and under the concept ‘picture-duck’. And a picture...is such a 
thing. -- But the impression is not simultaneously of a picture-duck and a picture-
rabbit. [...] The duck and rabbit aspects could not be described in an analogous 
way. You only ‘see the duck and rabbit aspects’ if you are already conversant 
with the shapes of those two animals...” 
 
Much can be said about the variant combinations of what is shown (e.g. rabbit, picture-
rabbit, duck-rabbit) and what is responded (e.g. ‘a rabbit’, ‘a duck-rabbit’, ‘now it’s a rabbit’) 
among the moments; however, the key point at present is that a response which implicitly 
acknowledges the ambiguity of the ‘duck-rabbit’ whole while reporting on one of its 
appearances entails thinking about the visual experience, not merely perceptively but 
conceptually:69 
 
“This shews the difference between the concepts. ‘Seeing as....’ is not part of 
perception.” 
 
The disjunctivism here (noted most explicitly in moment 9) is due, at least in part, then, to 
the role of concepts: to see x as y -- a duck, y1, or a rabbit, y2 -- is to place y1,2 under a concept 
-- DUCK or RABBIT, respectively; since neither entails the other, this is done at their mutual 
exclusion. Per Wollheim, Wittgenstein’s crucial point in utilizing this exemplar is that seeing-
as entails the introduction of a concept, f, into perception, since “for any x, whenever I 
perceive x, there is always some f such that I perceive x as f”.70 Seeing-in, conversely, does 
not introduce an f. It is a more primitive species of non-conceptual, perhaps pre-conceptual, 
perception, and so operates without identifying or individuating features contributive to the 
representation itself (viz. non-localization, per (2)), including and especially the medium-
object distinction (viz. twofoldness, per (3)), since such a process entails conceptualization of 
those features. Perhaps a formal expression would be: ‘for any x, whenever I perceive x 
representationally, I perceive some y in x, and only then may perceive y as f.’ Ultimately, the 
distinction between seeing-in and seeing-as may be couched in terms of their relation to 
‘straightforward perception,’ “the capacity...of perceiving things present to the senses.” Whereas 
seeing-as is directly related to this, seeing-in is related to what may be called ‘non-
straightforward perception,’ “a special capacity...to have perceptual experiences of things that are 
not present to the senses” (e.g., the absent or non-existent).71 This no doubt includes y. 
 
                                                          
68 Wittgenstein (1953): 195e, 199e, 205e; formatted. 
69 Wittgenstein (1953): 197e. 
70 Wollheim (1980b): 219, 220.  
71 Wollheim (1980b): 217. 
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4.2 Analysis in Late Anglophone Aesthetics 
The varieties of analysis at play throughout LAA vary among its principle figures; I shall take 
each in turn.  
Danto’s analytical method is, firstly, of the regressive mode, and secondly, of the 
resolutive-cum-transformative mixture. Analytic regression is evident through his use of 
historically-minded theories of art to derive contemporary aesthetics as premises or causes 
derive conclusions or effects, as in his three-stage development of art history as historical 
narrative. Analytic resolution-cum-transformation is evident through his rewriting of art 
history as the style matrix (transformative), itself devised from classes of K-relevant 
predicates, the logical constituents of the various movements comprising art history 
(resolutive).  
Goodman’s analytical method is wholeheartedly of the transformational mode, 
evident through his rewriting of standard linguistic elements as notational (or non-notational) 
symbol systems.  
Wollheim’s analytical method is, firstly, of the resolutive mode, and secondly, of the 
transformational mode. Analytic resolution is evident through his account of seeing-in and 
twofoldness to dissolve the picture plane into pictorial space and the objects seen in it,  
as well as in the three perceptual capacities into which he analyzes aesthetic experience. 
Analytic transformation is evident through the very principle of seeing-in, by which (e.g.) 
marks on canvas become psychologically transformed either in space or in identity.  
 
4.3 System in Late Anglophone Aesthetics 
The variety of system at play throughout LAA is indeed a plenary systematicity. In short, this 
is because neither Danto’s nor Goodman’s nor Wollheim’s system is defined in terms of the 
relations of its parts to some privileged kernel or index to some unanalyzable element.  
Danto’s system is a historical narrative. Though it may prima facie seem to tend toward 
procedural systematicity in the ordinary sense, it does not. This is because what drives the 
historical ‘procedure’ is the matrix layout, itself a composite of mutually-interrelating 
predicates. One could (as I have, elsewhere) draw a timeline above the matrix to coordinate 
periods in art history with the artistically relevant predicates or styles, but it would then be 
the matrix of predicates determining the sequence of the timeline, rather than vice versa.  
Goodman’s system is a symbol system; its set of syntactic and semantic requirements 
ensure, within the system, that one-to-one correspondence between characters and 
compliance classes are maintained. Such rules safeguard against global indexing toward a 
unitary element of the system. Were this to happen, it would not only fail to be notational, 
but fail to be a system, per Goodman.  
Wollheim’s system is a two- or three- fold psychological system; at its most unitary it 
requires bifurcation. That identity may never hold between the medium representing and the 
object represented prevents a convergence of the system into a unity.  
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4.4 Conclusion to Chapter 4 
The task of this chapter was to present the analytic and systematic methods by which the 
aesthetic philosophies of LAA figures function, especially in comparison to those of EAA. 
This was to be investigated in light of the dynamic proposed in §1.2, the statement of the 
problem and thesis of this dissertation: that the resolution of the PSI is explainable by a 
swapping of priority between EAA and LAA concerning the notions of analyticity and 
systematicity; it was hypothesized that LAA positioned system as primary and analysis as 
secondary. This appears to have been a proper assessment of LAA, given that the figures 
noted above analyze in order to formulate their systems, rather than vice versa.  
It has been shown that the major analytical methods at play throughout LAA are 
identifiable as those at play throughout analytic philosophy after the AT and LT, according 
to Beaney’s set-of-modes and the assessment that analytic philosophy (including LAA) is 
characterizable as a synthesis between paraphrastic-transformative and reductive-resolutive 
modes of analysis, with slight dominance of the former over the latter. This is our conclusion 
of secondary importance.  
It has also been shown that the major systematic method at play throughout LAA is 
identifiable as a plenary systematicity. This is our conclusion of primary importance.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Analyticity and Systematicity in Early and Late Anglophone Aesthetics 
 
 
5.1 General Conclusion 
The following restatements shall constitute a general conclusion to this dissertation.  
 
5.1 Restatement of the Early-Late Distinction in Anglophone Aesthetics 
By adopting and adapting a narrower scope of anglophone aesthetics, a significant 
organizational shift was entertained which established AA as biphasic, admitting of earlier 
(EAA) and later (LAA) phases, with each characterized by its respective exemplary texts.  
 
This was the early-late distinction.  
 
5.2 Restatement of the Unitary-Plenary Distinction in Anglophone Aesthetics 
By utilizing the art-history of cubism as a case-study, a distinction between two (three) senses 
of ‘system’ or ‘systematicity’ as applied to artworks was made; this distinction defined an 
artwork to be a system or systematic insofar as it is compositionally complex.  
Unitary systematicity privileges some single element as the system kernel, with the system so 
defined. Plenary systematicity privileges no single element as the system kernel, with the 
system defined rather by some other means.  
 
In analytic philosophy, this was applied to figures of both EAA and LAA.  
 
In painting, the monocularism of traditional techniques was suggested to align with the 
unitariness characteristic of idealism, and thus the unitary systematicity characteristic of 
idealist aesthetics; the multiocularism of modernist techniques was suggested to align with 
the plenitude characteristic of cubism, and thus the plenary systematicity characteristic of 
realist aesthetics.  
 
This was the unitary-plenary distinction. 
 
5.3 Restatement of the Problem and Thesis 
The Problem of Systematic Inconsistency (PSI) in anglophone aesthetics was presented as a 
problematic methodological tension between EAA and LAA that arises from establishing 
AA as biphasic through the early-late distinction. Namely, the PSI concerns a shift from 
reprobation in EAA to approbation in LAA toward systematic methodologies in 
philosophical aesthetics. The PSI originally stated by Gardner (2014) as G was paraphrased 
as G′ (§1.2). It was the task of this dissertation to show that the two entities s* and s in G′, 
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which prima facie present the tension noted above, are in fact not the same but different 
entities, s1* and s2 in G′, making it a constitutive rather than merely evaluative shift.  
Their difference is a difference in conceptualization of systematicity, namely, a difference 
between unitary and plenary conceptions of systematicity, as established through the unitary-
plenary (and ordinary) distinction(s).  
 
That EAA explicitly reprobates unitary-systematicity (s1), thereby emphasizing analytic 
methods as primary, whereas LAA explicitly approbates plenary-systematicity (s2), thereby 
emphasizing systematic methods as primary and analytic as secondary, and that EAA 
implicitly approbates plenary-systematicity, thereby emphasizing systematic methods as 
secondary, is the solution to the PSI. The EAA-LAA shift was so characterized by this 
swapping of priority between analyticity and systematicity in anglophone aesthetics.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cézanne (1900): Still Life with Faience Jug 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1, indicating outer contours or 
outlines of large areas.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2, indicating flat planes and their 
axes; arrows point into depth. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3, indicating ‘carry-through’ lines, 
objective (solid) and subjective (dotted). 
 
 
Figure 1.4, indicating volume movement and 
the creation of space and depth.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.5, indicating tension by way of a 
tension path among plane axes. 
 
 
Figure 1.6, indicating geometric shapes,  
objective (solid) and subjective (dotted). 
 
 
Figure 1.7, indicating rhythmic curved lines,  
both dynamic (curved/diagonal) and static 
(vertical/horizontal).  
 
 
Figure 1.8, indicating gradations or planes  
of colour, including proceeding (warm) and 
receding (cool) planes. 
 
 
Figure 1.9, indicating closure among positive 
(black/white) and negative (gray) areas.  
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Figure 2.1, Da Vinci (1494-1499): The Last Supper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2, Loran Diagramme, Da Vinci’s The Last Supper 
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Figure 3. Caravaggio (1606): Saint Jerome in Meditation 
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Figure 4. Courbet (c. 1871): Portrait of Régis Courbet 
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Figure 5.1, Bonney (1915): Ambroise Vollard, Photograph 
 
Figure 5.2, Picasso (1915): Ambroise Vollard, Sketch (Ingres) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3, Renoir (1908): Portrait of Ambroise Vollard 
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Figure 5.4, Cézanne (1899): Portrait of Ambroise Vollard 
 
Figure 5.5, Loran Diagramme,  
Cézanne’s Portrait of Ambroise Vollard 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6, Picasso (1909-10): Portrait of Ambroise Vollard 
 
Figure 5.7, Loran Diagramme,  
Picasso’s Portrait of Ambroise Vollard 
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Figure 6.1, Unknown (1906): Wilhelm Uhde, Photograph 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2, Picasso (1910, Sp.): Portrait of Wilhelm Uhde 
 
Figure 6.3, Loran Diagramme,  
Picasso’s Portrait of Wilhelm Uhde 
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Figure 7.1, Picasso (1910): Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler, Photograph 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2, Picasso (1910, Au.): Portrait of Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3, Loran (1963): Diagram for Figure 3 (Detail),  
Picasso’s Portrait of D. H. Kahnweiler 
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Figure 8. Picasso (1912): Man with a Violin 
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Figure 9.1, Vermeer (1662-1665): The Music Lesson 
 
Figure 9.2, Jenison (2013): The Music Lesson, recreation. 
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Figure 10. Cézanne (c. 1906): Mont Sainte-Victoire. 
Exemplar of passage, technic 1. 
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Figure 11. Picasso (1909): Seated Female Nude.  
Exemplar of faceting, technic 2. 
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Figure 12.1, Braque (1909): Violin and Palette. 
First instance of trompe l’oeil, technic 4. 
 
 
Figure 12.2, Braque (1910): Violin and Pitcher. 
Exemplar of trompe l’oeil, technic 4. 
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Figure 13. Braque (1911): The Portuguese. 
First instance of lettering, technic 5. 
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Figure 14. Picasso (1912): Still Life with Chair Caning. 
First instance of collage, technic 7. 
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Figure 15.1, Braque (1912): Fruitdish and Glass. 
First instance of papier collé, technic 8. 
 
 
Figure 15.2, Picasso (1912): Still Life with Violin and Fruits. 
Exemplar of papier collé, technic 8. 
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Figure 16. Picasso (1906): The Maidens of Avignon. 
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Figure 17. Metzinger (1911): Tea Time. 
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Figure 18. Picasso (1921): Three Musicians. 
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Figure 19 
 
THE SENSES OF BEAUTY* 
 
  
 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
XI 
XII 
XIII 
XIV 
XV 
XVI 
Anything is beautiful1 --  
 
which possesses the simple quality of Beauty.2 
which has a specified form.3 
which is an imitation of nature.  
which results from successful exploitation of a Medium. 
which is the work of Genius. 
which reveals (1) Truth, (2) the Spirit of Nature, (3) the Ideal,  
(4) the Universal, (5) the Typical.4 
which produces illusion. 
which leads to desirable Social effects.5 
which is an Expression. 
which causes Pleasure. 
which excited Emotions.  
which promotes a Specific emotion. 
which involves the processes of Empathy. 
which heightens Vitality. 
which brings us into touch with exceptional Personalities.  
which conduces to Synaesthesis.  
A 
B 
C6 
   
Adapted from Richards, Ogden, Wood (1925): 20-21. 
 
1 “The fields reached by these various approaches can all be cultivated and most 
of them are associated with well known names in the Philosophy of Art. [Ft.:] 
As this discussion is throughout concerned with the theory of Beauty, we are 
not called upon to examine the various senses in which the word Art has also 
been used. [...]” (22) 
2 Intrinsic beauty.  
3 “Objective beauty as certain relations, etc., in a physical complex.” (23) 
4 Revelation, generally.  
5 Uplift doctrines (i.e.).  
6 Psychological theories.  
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Figure 20.  
Swillens (1965): Plate 43(b), diagramme of Vermeer’s The Music Lesson 
 
 
The perspective constructions, which are exceedingly accurate, can be reduced to flat 
projections, and from them it is possible to determine the proportions of the space... In 
these spaces are objects...amongst other things, of which we know the measurements, 
and with the help of which it is possible to determine the length, width, and height 
measurements of the rooms... It is equally possible to decide accurately the places of 
people and things, whereby we obtain an exact picture of the reality as observed by 
Vermeer.  
 
*          *          * 
 
The diagonal of the marble squares of the floor is parallel to the basic line in every 
picture and is always in the same proportion to objects, of which we know the 
measurements... The point of vision [viewpoint] -- and therewith the level of the horizon -- 
can be accurately determined in all the pictures. O—H (O′—H′) is the distance between 
the painter’s eye and the wall farthest away from him (i.e. the side wall of the room). 
O′—P′ is the distance between the ground level and the painter’s eye (i.e. the place 
where he was painting from). The part of the rooms which is depicted in the paintings 
is outlined with thick lines. [...] On some projections it is indicated...what distance from 
the eye the scene (T—T′ the canvas or panel) is intended to be. 
 
From the following considerations it will become evident that Vermeer has depicted 
five different rooms. All the paintings having one of these rooms as subject, will be 
discussed in groups marked A, B, C, D, E. 
 
1 
 
 
 
5 
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1 Swillens (1965): 69-70, 76.  
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(a) Plan view 
 
 
(b) Side view 
 
(c) Axonometric view 
 
Figure 21.1  
Steadman (2001): Figures 33 & 40, diagrammes of Vermeer’s The Music Lesson 
 
  
The original methods for constructing measured perspective views...were essentially 
techniques for setting out images of gridded horizontal surfaces -- such as, precisely, 
tiled floors. The painter, knowing the true three-dimensional shape of any object, figure, 
or building that he wanted to depict, and knowing its position on this ground surface, 
could derive a perspective image of the object by reference to the grid. I followed a 
procedure that essentially reverses this process: to infer, from the two-dimensional 
perspective image, the three-dimensional forms of the room and furniture that the 
image represents. [...]1 
1 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
  
1 Steadman (2001): 73, formatted.    
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(a) Vanishing Point, P, and Horizon 
 
 
(b) Distance Point, D 
 
 
 
 
(c) Viewpoint, V 
 
 
(d) Projectors AA′, etc. 
 
Figure 21.2  
Steadman (2001): Figures 29-32, diagrammes of Vermeer’s The Music Lesson 
 
  
There are four steps in the process of three-dimensional reconstruction. 
 
1. The first step involves finding the central vanishing point [V] of the picture...and 
drawing a horizontal line through this point to mark the theoretical horizon... 
 
All of Vermeer’s interiors are ‘frontal’ or ‘central’ perspectives: that is, the plane of the 
picture is set precisely parallel with the far wall of the room. [...] The result is that 
in each painting...there is a single vanishing point, at which the images of lines 
receding away from the viewer converge. [...]1 
 
2. The next step is to draw in the images of the diagonal lines made by the patterns of 
floor tiles, and continue them to meet the horizon line. These diagonals also converge, 
in two points to the right and left of the picture, which lie, like the vanishing point, on 
the horizon. These are the distance points [D]. The distance points are spaced equally on 
either side of the vanishing point. [...] These values provide information with which to 
determine the position -- in space, in front of the painting -- of the picture’s theoretical 
viewpoint [V].* [...] The viewpoint in this type of perspective lies on a line perpendicular 
to the picture plane, passing through the central vanishing point. The distance of the 
viewpoint from the plane of the picture is equal to the distance between the vanishing 
point and either of the distance points. [...] 
 
The precise position of the theoretical viewpoint -- the notional point in space at 
which Vermeer placed his eye -- can be determined in each case. Everything 
which is visible in the painting itself must be contained within a ‘visual pyramid’, 
whose apex is at this viewpoint. It is possible to determine the positions of the 
sloping lines that form the edges of this pyramid. Suppose that these lines are 
continued back, through the viewpoint, to meet the back wall of the room, 
1 
 
 
 
5 
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behind the painter. They then define a rectangular area on that wall. In at least 
half a dozen cases this rectangle is the precise size of the painting in question. 
 
My explanation for this very curious result is that Vermeer had a camera obscura 
with a lens at the painting’s viewpoint. [...]2 
 
3. Once the position of the viewpoint is established it is possible to move to the next 
step, that of working out a plan view [top-view] of the room and furniture. The plan of 
the tile pattern is determined first of all. This is done by extending the pattern back 
from the line where the floor cuts the plane of the picture... The sizes of the tiles can be 
measured directly at this floor line (labelled FF).  
 
There are then two ways of finding the position in plan of some chosen point on any 
other object or feature appearing in the painting. Either the position can be found by 
means of its ‘grid reference’ in relation to the pattern of tiles... Alternatively a line can be 
carried from the viewpoint through the image of some feature in the picture plane to 
meet the position on the floor or wall surface where that feature is located. A line of 
this kind is called a projector [AA′]. If the picture plane is imagined as a sheet of glass, 
then the projector can be thought of as a ray of light reflected from the object, passing 
through the picture plane, to meet the artist’s eye at the viewpoint. Our process of 
reconstruction follows the path of this ray backwards, from eye, through picture, to 
object.  
 
Thus the point A′ ... is the image in the painting of the point A at the edge of the floor 
in the room itself. We draw a straight line, the projector, joining the picture’s viewpoint 
to this point A′ in the picture. We continue the projector beyond the picture to meet the 
floor plane, in order to determine the exact position of the point A in the scene. ...[T]wo 
more projectors BB′ and CC′ [are] used to find points B and C. With these the whole 
outline shape of the visible part of the floor can be determined.  
 
4. The final step, that of drawing a side view of the room, is very similar to that for the 
plan. Again the positions of objects are determined by drawing projectors. [...]3 
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1 Steadman (2001): 74-75; formatted.  
2 Ibid.: 2-3; formatted. Cf. Figures 49-51 (and 71), not reproduced here.  
3 Ibid.: 75-79; formatted. 
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